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Pharmaceutical Efficacy: The Illusory 
Legal Standard 
Jonathan J. Darrow* 
Abstract 
The very long and expensive process of new drug research and 
development might suggest to observers that the efficacy standard 
for drugs is elevated and substantial, but this is not the case. Under 
the U.S. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, new drug approval 
merely requires that there be “substantial evidence that the drug 
will have the effect it purports or is represented to have.” While the 
evidence of effectiveness must therefore be substantial, the efficacy 
attested to by that evidence need not surpass any particular 
threshold (other than zero), thus allowing drugs with de minimis 
efficacy to be approved and sold at market rates. No other concept, 
principal, or standard applied during the approval process or after 
changes this result. The “gold standard,” which includes the 
elements of blinding, randomization, and placebo control, is 
described in but not required by the drug statute, and in any event 
addresses various problems related to bias rather than magnitude 
of efficacy. Similarly, the concept of “statistical significance,” which 
constitutes an essential element of modern research protocols, 
addresses the problem of certainty, not degree, of efficacy. The 
statutory requirement of “clinical significance,” far from ensuring 
“substantial efficacy,” demands no more than that there be 
statistical significance in a human study (as opposed to, for 
example, an animal study). Rather than specifying a fixed level of 
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efficacy or even a flexible standard of efficacy that a drug must 
possess, the U.S. drug approval framework thus fully delegates to 
drug companies and to the free market the determination of what 
level of efficacy is acceptable. The critical implication is that the 
public (and physicians and insurers) should not rely on the fact of 
FDA approval as an indication that medicines, including new and 
very highly priced ones, possess efficacy that is meaningfully 
greater than no efficacy at all. 
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I. Introduction 
David Kessler, a former Commissioner of the U.S. Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA), once boasted to Congress that the 
agency’s “rigorous demand for safety and efficacy . . . makes FDA 
approval the international gold standard.”1 If the U.S. drug 
approval system does indeed set the global efficacy benchmark, it 
is a cause for concern. Although the FDA deserves praise for its 
significant efforts in promoting safety and promptly approving new 
medicines, the agency operates under a legal efficacy standard that 
is as likely to engender disbelief as it is to incite indignation: 
                                                                                                     
 1. Testimony on FDA’s Role in Protecting and Promoting Public Health: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Labor and Human Res., 104th Cong. (Feb. 21, 
1996) (statement of David A. Kessler, Comm’r, Food and Drug Administration), 
available at http://www.hhs.gov/asl/testify/t960221a.html. 
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Under U.S. law, there is no particular level of efficacy required for 
a new drug to be approved.2 Instead, drugs with near-zero efficacy 
can be approved, prescribed, and sold to patients who have real 
and sometimes very serious diseases or conditions.3  
Patients and physicians would be right to consider this 
assertion skeptically. How could an ineffective drug be approved 
under a legal system where it is axiomatic that all new drugs must 
be proven “safe and effective”4 prior to government approval? This 
familiar and comforting rhetoric, however, conceals the illusory 
nature of what the underlying legal standard actually requires. 
The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act5 requires only that 
there be “substantial evidence that the drug will have the effect it 
purports or is represented to have.”6 It is the thesis of this Article 
that this standard, along with the related concepts of gold 
standard testing, statistical significance, and clinical significance, 
do not prevent FDA approval of substantially ineffective remedies.  
The implications are alarming. Not only does an illusory 
efficacy standard create the possibility that many expensive drugs 
marketed today are essentially worthless, but the near-universal 
(but false) perception that FDA approval guarantees substantial 
effectiveness can lead physicians and patients to cede 
responsibility for critically evaluating drug value, thus adversely 
affecting treatment choices. While this harm must be balanced 
against the tremendous benefits flowing from FDA regulation, it 
nevertheless raises the specter that, in a significant sense, the 
stamp of “FDA approval” may actually work to harm public health. 
                                                                                                     
 2. See 21 U.S.C § 355(d) (2012) (stating that FDA Drug Approval 
guidelines require “substantial evidence” that “the drug will have the effect it 
purports or is represented to have”). 
 3. See Joan E. Shreffler, Bad Medicine: Good-Faith FDA Approval as a 
Recommended Bar to Punitive Damages in Pharmaceutical Products Liability 
Cases, 84 N.C. L. REV. 737, 758 (2006) (discussing how a grant of FDA approval 
only requires the benefits of a drug to outweigh foreseeable risks). 
 4. See, e.g., Pliva v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2574 (2011) (noting that 
among the issues not in dispute was the fact that “[u]nder . . . the Federal Food, 
Drug and Cosmetic Act . . . a manufacturer seeking federal approval to market a 
new drug must prove that it is safe and effective”).  
 5. 21 U.S.C. § 301. 
 6. Id. § 355(d).  
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II. The Illusory Legal Standard for Drug Efficacy 
The legal standard that is most closely related to the level of 
efficacy a new drug must possess in order to receive FDA approval 
is set forth in a lengthy section of Title 21 of the United States 
Code, the relevant portion of which states: 
If the Secretary finds . . . that . . . there is a lack of substantial 
evidence that the drug will have the effect it purports or is 
represented to have . . . or [the drug’s] labeling is false or 
misleading in any particular [then] he shall issue an order 
refusing to approve the [new drug] application.7 
This language may sound as if it does not impose a requirement for 
any particular level of efficacy, and in fact it does not do so.8 The 
phrases “substantial evidence” and “the effect it purports or is 
represented to have” do impose efficacy-related requirements on 
drug sponsors.9 Neither, however, requires drugs to have anything 
more than next-to-zero levels of efficacy.10 What these two phrases 
require—and do not require—is discussed next.  
A. “The Effect It Purports or Is Represented to Have” 
Section 355(d), quoted above, does specify a level of efficacy 
that new drugs must have if they are to be approved. That level of 
efficacy is defined by statute to be whatever level the drug 
“purports or is represented to have.”11 In other words, rather than 
                                                                                                     
 7. Id. § 355(d) (emphasis added). 
 8. See DANIEL CARPENTER, REPUTATION AND POWER: ORGANIZATION IMAGE 
AND PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATION AT THE FDA 146, 156, 192–93 (2010) 
(describing efficacy as “a slippery concept,” “indefinable,” and “robustly 
ambiguous,” and discussing the absence of agreement or precision with respect 
to what was meant by “efficacy”).  
 9. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (2012) (describing grounds for refusing 
application, approval of application, and substantial evidence). 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. Strictly speaking, the term “efficacy” refers to the benefits a drug 
produces under ideal conditions, that is, under the controlled conditions of a 
clinical trial. In contrast, the term “effectiveness” refers to the benefits a drug 
produces under the usual circumstances of health care practice. See STEDMAN’S 
MEDICAL DICTIONARY (27th ed. 2000) (defining “efficacy” and “effectiveness”); 
STAN N. FINKELSTEIN & PETER TEMIN, REASONABLE RX: SOLVING THE DRUG PRICE 
CRISIS 9, 21 (2008) (noting similar definitions used by the European Union and 
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specifying a fixed level of efficacy or a even a flexible standard of 
efficacy that a drug must possess, the statute fully delegates to 
drug companies the ability to specify any level of efficacy they 
desire.12 If clinical test results demonstrate that a drug’s efficacy 
that is only slightly above zero, that drug can nevertheless receive 
FDA approval so long as companies do not purport in the labeling 
that the drug is more effective than the evidence supports.13 The 
accompanying regulations merely repeat the statutory words 
verbatim, adding no additional requirement or clarification 
regarding efficacy level.14 As a result, the standard is almost 
entirely illusory because it leaves to the drug sponsor the ability to 
specify any non-zero level of efficacy.15  
The real world result is predictable: Statements of efficacy 
contained in drug labels are often nearly meaningless, but are 
presented in such a way as to deemphasize the level of efficacy 
patients can expect while emphasizing the symptoms from which 
patients are seeking relief. For example, over-the-counter labeling 
for the analgesic Motrin (ibuprofen) states, innocently enough, that 
it “temporarily relieves minor aches and pains due to: headache . . . 
backache . . . muscular aches [and] toothaches . . . .”16 A patient 
who wants a headache to go away might mistakenly assume that 
                                                                                                     
by the International Network of Agencies for Health Technology Assessment, an 
international organization comprising agencies from twenty-nine countries); 
Hans-Georg Eichler et al., Relative Efficacy of Drugs: An Emerging Issue 
Between Regulatory Agencies and Third-Party Payers, 9 NATURE REVIEWS DRUG 
DISCOVERY 277, 279 box 1 (Apr. 2010) (same). However, because the terms are 
often used interchangeably or inconsistently with these definitions, the term 
“efficacy” will generally be used throughout this work for simplicity. 
 12. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (2012) (discussing grounds for refusing 
applications and defining “substantial evidence”). 
 13. Id.  
 14. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.125(b)(5) (2009) (echoing the identical “substantial 
evidence” requirement found in federal statute). 
 15. Cf. Kenyon v. Jennings, 560 F. Supp. 878, 881 (D. Kan. 1983) (“An 
illusory promise is ‘a purported promise that actually promises nothing because 
it leaves to the speaker the choice of performance or nonperformance.’” (quoting 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 674 (5th ed. 1979))). 
 16. Drug Label for Motrin (ibuprofen), http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugs 
atfda_docs/label/2007/017463s105lbl.pdf (last visited Sept. 29, 2012) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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ibuprofen can accomplish this result, at least temporarily, in light 
of the “temporar[y] relie[f]” promised in the label.17  
Those who swallow two caplets of ibuprofen, however, are 
unlikely to experience either immediate or complete disappearance 
of pain. One double-blind, randomized and controlled trial, for 
example, found that of seventy-five patients who took all three of 
ibuprofen, acetaminophen or placebo at different times, eighteen 
preferred ibuprofen, eighteen acetaminophen, twelve placebo, and 
twenty-seven expressed no preference, which differences in 
preference were not statistically significant.18 Another randomized, 
blinded study assessed the intensity of headache on a four point 
scale (4 = intense; 3 = moderate; 2 = slight; 1 = none).19 Three 
hours after treatment, those taking ibuprofen reported scores of 
2.05, while those taking placebo reported an average score of 2.48, 
a statistically significant but hardly impressive difference.20 The 
difference becomes even smaller (though still statistically 
significant) when one realizes that the baseline average scores for 
the two groups were different: 2.74 for those taking ibuprofen 
versus 2.98 for those taking placebo, yielding reductions in pain of 
0.69 (2.74 minus 2.05) for ibuprofen versus 0.50 (2.98 minus 2.48) 
for placebo.21 A number of other studies reveal similarly 
unimpressive efficacy in relieving headache pain.22 The Motrin 
                                                                                                     
 17. Id. 
 18. Mirja L. Hamalainen et al., Ibuprofen or Acetaminophen for the Acute 
Treatment of Migraine in Children: A Double-Blind, Randomized, Placebo-
Controlled Crossover Study, 48(1) NEUROLOGY 103, 106 (1997) (finding other 
measurements of pain relief were nevertheless statistically significant).  
 19. Seymour Diamond, Ibuprofen Versus Aspirin and Placebo in the 
Treatment of Muscle Contraction Headache, 23(5) HEADACHE: J. HEAD & FACE 
PAIN 206, 207 (1983). 
 20. Id. at 208 tbl.1. 
 21. Id.  
 22. See, e.g., J.M.A. Van Gerven et al., Self-Medication of a Single 
Headache Episode with Ketoprofen, Ibuprofen or Placebo, Home-Monitored with 
an Electronic Patient Diary, 42 BRIT. J. CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY 475, 478 fig.1 
(1996) (showing no advantage of ibuprofen over placebo during the first two 
hours of observations); cf. Alan Branthwaite & Peter Cooper, Analgesic Effects of 
Branding in Treatment of Headaches, 282 (6276) BRIT. MED. J. 1576, 1577 tbl.II 
(1981) (reporting substantial improvements in headache pain for 86% of those 
given unbranded aspirin versus 74% of those given unbranded placebo); Roger 
Chou et al., Comparative Effectiveness and Safety of Analgesics for 
Osteoarthritis, OREGON EVIDENCE-BASED PRACTICE CTR.: DRUG EFFECTIVENESS 
REVIEW PROJECT, REVIEW NO. 4, Sept. 2006, at 10, http://effectivehealth 
2080 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2073 (2013) 
(ibuprofen) drug label, however, makes neither the claim that 
relief is immediate nor that it is complete.23 In fact, it promises no 
particular level of relief at all.24  
Although Motrin is an over-the-counter drug, many 
prescription drugs also promise no particular level of relief. Among 
the top-selling prescription drugs in a recent year were Cymbalta 
(duloxetine), Plavix (clopidogrel), and Enbrel (etanercept).25 
Cymbalta, a serotonin and norepinephrine reuptake inhibitor, is 
indicated for depression, anxiety, fibromyalgia, and 
musculoskeletal pain.26 A television commercial for Cymbalta 
emphasizes the symptoms of depression but, with respect to 
efficacy, notes only that “Cymbalta can help” and that 
“Cymbalta . . . treats many symptoms of depression.”27 The 
television commercial for Enbrel (etanercept) similarly states only 
that “Enbrel can help relieve pain, stiffness, and stop joint 
damage.”28 Small print briefly viewable during the advertisement 
states that “Enbrel was shown to be effective in 50% of psoriatic 
                                                                                                     
care.ahrq.gov/repFiles/AnalgesicsFinal.pdf (noting that several recent “good-
quality systematic reviews” by the Cochrane Collaboration found no clear 
differences among nonselective NSAIDs in efficacy for treating knee, back, or 
hip pain). But see Bernard P. Schachtel & William R. Thoden, Onset of Action of 
Ibuprofen in the Treatment of Muscle-Contraction Headache, 28 HEADACHE: J. 
HEAD & FACE PAIN 471 (1988) (finding that ibuprofen provided substantially 
greater pain relief than placebo, but admitting that participating subjects were 
selected only if they reported previously satisfactory experience with 
nonprescription analgesics, i.e., participants may not have been representative 
subjects because they may have been unusually responsive to ibuprofen 
treatment). 
 23. Drug Label for Motrin (ibuprofen), supra note 16. 
 24. Id. 
 25. See Matthew Herper, The Best-Selling Drugs in America, FORBES (Apr. 
19, 2011, 8:48 AM), www.forbes.com/sites/matthewherper/2011/04/19/the-best-
selling-drugs-in-america (last visited Oct. 21, 2013) (listing the top-selling 
medicines in the United States in 2010) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 26. Drug Label for Cymbalta (duloxetine hydrochloride) Delayed-Release 
Capsules for Oral Use, Oct. 2010, Reference ID 2860327, at 1, 
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/label/2010/022516lbl.pdf. 
 27. Tracy Shier, Cymbalta Commercial (real one), YOUTUBE (Nov. 2, 2009), 
http://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=OTZvnAF7UsA (last visited Sept. 23, 2013) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 28. Enbrel TV Spot Featuring Phil Mickelson, http://www.ispot.tv/ad/7VfC/ 
enbrel-featuring-phil-mickelson (last visited Apr. 10, 2013) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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arthritis patients at 6 months,” but this statement addresses only 
the fraction of people who experienced any relief, not the amount of 
relief experienced by those patients.29 Moreover, by implication the 
other half experienced no relief. A Plavix (clopidogrel) commercial 
boasts, as it changes ominous background music associated with 
symptoms to more uplifting music associated with the drug 
treatment, that “Plavix, in combination with aspirin and other 
heart medicines helps provide greater protection against heart 
attack or stroke than aspirin and other medicines alone.”30 The 
FDA has rebuked the maker of Plavix for overstating similar 
claims of efficacy in Plavix print advertisements.31  
In each of these commercials, there is no claim to any 
particular level of efficacy.32 How much Cymbalta can “help” 
mitigate symptoms of depression, how much “Enbrel helps . . . stop 
joint damage” and how much Plavix “helps” protect against heart 
attack and stroke, are questions all conveniently left for the 
television viewer to imagine.33 The imagination, however, is not 
                                                                                                     
 29. Id.  
 30. LowPricePlavix, Plavix TV Commercial, YOUTUBE (Aug. 30, 2010), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oHRX0b4kPNY (last visited Oct. 21, 2013) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 31. See Letter from Andrew S.T. Haffer, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., to 
Kenneth Palmer, Sanofi Pharms. (May 9, 2001), http://www.fda. 
gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Enforcement
ActivitiesbyFDA/WarningLettersandNoticeofViolationLetterstoPharmaceutical
Companies/UCM166467.pdf (advising that a Plavix visual aid overstated and 
mislead viewers about the drug’s efficacy); see also Letter from Janet Norden, 
U.S. Food & Drug Admin., to Gregory M. Torre, Sanofi Pharms. (Dec. 18, 1998), 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformatio
n/EnforcementActivitiesbyFDA/WarningLettersandNoticeofViolationLetterstoP
harmaceuticalCompanies/UCM166391.pdf (“[C]laims that suggest Plavix has 
been ‘proven’ to be more effective than aspirin are misleading because they are 
not based on substantial evidence.”); Deepak L. Bhatt et al., Clopidogrel and 
Aspirin Versus Aspirin Alone for the Prevention of Atherothrombotic Events, 
354(16) NEW ENG. J. MED. 1706, 1714 (2006) (“[T]he combination of clopidogrel 
plus aspirin was not significantly more effective than aspirin alone in reducing 
the rate of myocardial infarction, stroke, or death from cardiovascular 
causes . . . .”).  
 32. See supra notes 26–30 and accompanying text (asserting claims to help 
particular ailments but no degrees of aid).  
 33. The claim that “Enbrel can help relieve pain, stiffness, and stop joint 
damage” is particularly interesting because it is grammatically awkward. If an 
“and” were inserted between “pain” and “stiffness,” then the word “help” would 
modify only those two words. The use of the comma instead of “and,” by 
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left entirely to chance. The music, imagery, prescription status, 
and fact of FDA approval, among other things, all help the viewer 
to imagine that the drug must be substantially effective, without 
ever stating this directly.  
Because the efficacy standard is a fully-adjustable hurdle, 
drugs that are able to jump that hurdle may be substantially 
ineffective, much as a five-year old can easily jump over a rope if 
that rope is lying on the ground. This is true not only for new 
drugs that are approved under the “purports or is represented to 
have” standard, but also for those approved prior to 1962, the year 
the standard was first introduced by the Kevauver-Harris Drug 
Amendments Act.34 After the 1962 Act was passed, the FDA 
Commissioner decided to retrospectively evaluate about 4,000 pre-
1962 drug formulations in what became known as the Drug 
Efficacy Study Implementation (DESI).35 DESI engaged thirty 
panels of experts who were asked to classify the drug claims as 
either (1) effective, (2) probably effective, (3) possibly effective, or 
(4) ineffective.36 It is often recognized that the large majority (81%) 
of drug claims subject to DESI review were classified in the latter 
three categories.37 That is, drugs approved between 1938 and 1962 
could not be said to be unqualifiedly effective for (on average) four 
                                                                                                     
contrast, may be intended to make it sound as if “Enbrel can . . . stop joint 
damage” (a claim of 100% efficacy) when in reality the claim is only that “Enbrel 
can help . . . stop joint damage” (a claim of no particular level of efficacy).  
 34. Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (1962) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 301).  
 35. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, DRUG EFFICACY STUDY: FINAL REPORT TO 
THE COMMISSIONER OF FOOD AND DRUGS, FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION 1 
(1969) (describing the Commissioner’s decision to examine pre-1962 approved 
drugs still on the market). 
 36. Id. at 42–43.  
 37. See, e.g., Ralph F. Hall, Right Question, Wrong Answer: A Response to 
Professor Epstein and the “Permititis” Challenge, 94 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 
50, 70 (2010) (noting that only 19.1% of reviewed claims gained an “effective” 
rating); Matthew J. Seamon, Plan B for the FDA: A Need for a Third Class of 
Drug Regulation in the United States Involving a “Pharmacist-Only” Class of 
Drugs, 12 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 521, 541 n.172 (2006) (same); see also 
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 35, at 7. The 81% figure also included two 
additional rating categories, namely, “[e]ffective, but . . .” (i.e., where “much 
better safer or more conveniently administered drugs were . . . available”) and 
“[i]neffective as a fixed combination” (i.e., based on the principle that multiple 
drugs should not be administered when a single drug alone would be effective). 
Hall, supra, at 70.  
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out of five claims, under the legal standard put in place in 1962.38 
Less recognized in discussions of DESI is that even for those drugs 
that were placed into the most favorable category (“effective”), this 
categorization was based only on whether the drug could be said, 
based upon substantial evidence, to have “the effect [it] purports or 
is represented to have.”39 Under this standard, drugs could have 
received (and probably did receive) the top rating even if evidence 
showed them to perform only marginally better than nothing (i.e., 
placebo), so long as manufacturers did not claim that the drugs 
could do more than that. 
B. Substantial Evidence of Efficacy Versus Evidence of Substantial 
Efficacy 
The statutory language that most directly constitutes an 
efficacy standard is the requirement that a new drug have that 
level of efficacy that it “purports or is represented to have.”40 This 
is not the only language relating to efficacy, however. Earlier in 
the same sentence is the requirement that a new drug cannot be 
approved by the FDA unless there is “substantial evidence that the 
drug will have the effect it purports or is represented to have.”41 
This quoted language might be shortened to a requirement that 
there be “substantial evidence [of efficacy].” Critically, the statute 
does not require “evidence of substantial efficacy.” Although a 
subtle distinction in word order, the statutory language makes 
clear something of great moment: it is not the efficacy of a drug 
that must be substantial in order to receive approval, but the 
evidence supporting that efficacy.  
Rather than require any minimum level of efficacy, the 
requirement of “substantial evidence” is merely an evidentiary 
standard, that is, it refers to the amount or sufficiency of evidence 
needed to support a conclusion. Like evidentiary standards in 
general, “substantial evidence” has no precise definition. In the 
spectrum of evidentiary standards, however, it is among the 
                                                                                                     
 38. See Hall, supra note 37, at 70–71 (recognizing the 81% statistic); 
Seamon, supra note 37, at 541 n.172 (same).  
 39. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 35, at 43.  
 40. 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (2012). 
 41. Id. (emphasis added). 
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easiest to satisfy. As construed by the Fourth Circuit, “substantial 
evidence requires more than a scintilla, but less than a 
preponderance, of the evidence.”42 This definition places the 
required sufficiency of evidence below not only a preponderance of 
the evidence (greater than 50% likelihood), but also far below 
“clear and convincing evidence” (greater than, perhaps, 80% 
likelihood) and toward the opposite end of the spectrum from 
“beyond a reasonable doubt” (perhaps, near 100%).43 It is therefore 
no wonder that New York’s highest court has described 
“substantial evidence” as “a minimal standard,”44 while a 
Delaware court described it as “the lowest standard of proof.”45 The 
Sixth Circuit has added that even “the possibility of drawing two 
inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an 
administrative agency’s finding from being supported by 
substantial evidence.”46  
                                                                                                     
 42. Jackson v. Astrue, No. 10–2226, 2012 WL 580239, at *1 (4th Cir. Feb. 
23, 2012) (citing Mastro v. Apfel, 270 F.3d 171, 176 (4th. Cir. 2001)).  
 43. There is a notable lack of consensus on exact percentages equivalents, 
other than the preponderance of the evidence standard, for which there is 
substantial but not universal agreement. See, e.g., United States v. Shonubi, 895 
F. Supp. 460, 471 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (“A survey of judges . . . found general 
agreement that ‘a preponderance of the evidence’ translates into 50+ percent 
probability. Eight judges estimated “clear and convincing” as between 60 and 70 
percent probable . . . . Estimates for ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ ranged from 76 
to 90 percent, with 85 percent the modal response.”), vacated on other grounds, 
103 F.3d 1085 (1997); Barbara D. Underwood, The Thumb on the Scales of 
Justice: Burdens of Persuasion in Criminal Cases, 86 YALE L.J. 1299, 1311 
(1977) (“[A]lmost a third of the responding judges put ‘beyond a reasonable 
doubt’ at 100%, another third . . . at 90% or 95%, and most of the rest put it at 
80% or 85%. For the preponderance standard, by contrast, over half put it at 
55%, and most . . . put it between 60%, and 75%.”); Byron K. Warnken, 
Litigating “Forfeiture by Wrongdoing” After Crawford v. Washington, 41-AUG 
MD. B.J. 22, 24 (2008) (noting the “risk of factual error” to be “about 30 percent” 
under the clear and convincing evidence standard and “49 percent” under the 
preponderance of the evidence standard).  
 44. FMC Corp. v. Unmack, 699 N.E.2d 893, 896 (N.Y. 1998).  
 45. In re Susan S., No. 7764, 1996 WL 75343, at *12 (Del. Ch. Feb. 8, 1996) 
(citing Shipman v. Div. of Soc. Servs., 454 A.2d 767 (Del. Fam. Ct. 1982), aff'd, 
460 A.2d 528 (Del. 1983)); see also Conn. Light & Power Co. v. Dep’t of Pub. Util. 
Control, 830 A.2d 1121, 1131 (Conn. 2003) (“Th[e] substantial evidence standard 
is highly deferential and permits less judicial scrutiny than a clearly erroneous 
or weight of the evidence standard of review.”) (quoting MacDermid, Inc. v. 
Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 778 A.2d 7 (Conn. 2001)). 
 46. Painting Co. v. NLRB, 298 F.3d 492, 499 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting NLRB 
v. Ky. May Coal Co., 89 F.3d 1235, 1241 (6th Cir. 1996)). The court also noted 
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The Senate Report accompanying the 1962 Kefauver-Harris 
drug amendments clarifies what this standard means in the 
pharmaceutical context: “When a drug has been adequately tested 
by qualified experts and has been found to have the effect claimed 
for it, this claim should be permitted even though there may be 
preponderant evidence to the contrary based upon equally reliable 
studies.”47 The Senate Report, which is not itself law, is thus 
consistent with the general meaning of substantial evidence in 
that it will allow a claim to prevail even if the preponderance of the 
evidence indicates that it should fail. “Substantial evidence” is a 
“highly deferential standard” that is often used by courts when 
evaluating administrative agency decisions,48 allowing those 
decisions to stand even if the court would have reached a different 
conclusion based upon the same evidence. In the context of 
pharmaceuticals, the Senate Report explains that the deferential 
standard was intended to allow approval in “a situation in which a 
new drug has been studied in a limited number of hospitals and 
clinics and its effectiveness established only to the satisfaction of a 
few investigators qualified to use it,” or in other words, to ensure 
that minority viewpoints may be acted upon.49  
The same statute that sets forth the substantial evidence 
requirement also elaborates with respect to its meaning,50 
explaining that: 
The term “substantial evidence” means evidence consisting of 
adequate and well-controlled investigations, including clinical 
investigations, by experts qualified by scientific training and 
experience to evaluate the effectiveness of the drug involved, on 
the basis of which it could fairly and responsibly be concluded 
                                                                                                     
that “[t]he substantial evidence standard is a lower standard than [the] weight 
of the evidence [standard].” Id. at 499.  
 47. S. REP. NO. 87-1744 (1962), reprinted in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2884, 2892 
(1962) (emphasis added).  
 48. Conn. Light & Power Co., 830 A.2d at 1131. 
 49. S. REP. NO. 87-1744 (1962), reprinted in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2884, 2892 
(1962). The Senate Report also suggests that the substantial evidence standard 
may be important in allowing approval of drugs that help “a substantial 
percentage of the patients in a given disease condition but [that] will not be 
effective in other cases.” Id. 
 50. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (2012) (limiting the definition by its terms to the 
efficacy portion of the new drug approval statute). 
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by such experts that the drug will have the effect it purports or 
is represented to have . . . . 51 
The usual substantial evidence standard is thus delineated more 
precisely in the context of drug approval to require “adequate and 
well controlled investigations, including clinical 
investigations . . . .”52 This phrase constitutes the basis for the 
requirement of clinical (i.e., human) trials. Moreover, because 
“adequate and well-controlled investigations”53 is in the plural 
form, it has been interpreted by the FDA to generally require at 
least two separate clinical trials,54 although the FDA will 
sometimes approve a new drug on the basis of a single study.55 The 
practice of approving a new drug on the basis of a single study, 
already a part of FDA practice, was codified by the FDA 
Modernization Act of 1997 (FDAMA),56 which added a provision 
explicitly empowering the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services57 to approve drugs on the basis of a single study under 
certain circumstances: 
If the Secretary determines, based on relevant science, that 
data from one adequate and well-controlled clinical 
investigation and confirmatory evidence (obtained prior to or 
after such investigation) are sufficient to establish effectiveness, 
                                                                                                     
 51. Id. (emphasis added). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id.  
 54. See Warner-Lambert Co. v. Heckler, 787 F.2d 147, 151 (3d Cir. 1986) 
(“Because the Act uses the plural ‘investigations,’ the FDA requires drug 
manufacturers to submit at least two ‘adequate and well-controlled’ studies 
showing the effectiveness of the drug.”). 
 55. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: PROVIDING 
CLINICAL EVIDENCE OF EFFECTIVENESS FOR HUMAN DRUG AND BIOLOGICAL 
PRODUCTS 3 (1998) [hereinafter FDA GUIDANCE], 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformatio
n/Guidances/UCM078749.pdf (describing scenarios when a single clinical study 
was approved); New Drug, Antibiotic, and Biological Drug Product Regulations; 
Accelerated Approval, 57 Fed. Reg. 58,942 (Dec. 11, 1992) (codified at 21 C.F.R. 
§§ 314 and 601) (noting the FDA’s existing practice of occasionally approving 
drugs on the basis of a single study “where the study was of excellent design 
[and] showed a high degree of statistical significance”).  
 56. Pub. L. No. 105-115, § 115(a), 111 Stat. 2296 (codified at 21 U.S.C. 
§ 355(d)). 
 57. See 21 U.S.C. § 321(d) (2012) (defining “Secretary” to mean “Secretary 
of Health and Human Services”). 
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the Secretary may consider such data and evidence to constitute 
substantial evidence for purposes of the preceding sentence.58 
While approving a drug on the basis of a single study might be 
criticized as constituting a loosening of the standard, the more 
important concern is that even two trials will not ensure that new 
drugs possess substantial efficacy because the number of trials 
relates most directly only to the quantity of evidence rather than to 
any measure of efficacy level.59 Drug companies may spend $1 
billion over a decade or longer to test a drug for effectiveness in 
order to satisfy the substantial evidence standard.60 This expense 
in both time and money, however, is primarily devoted not to 
increasing the efficacy of a drug nor even to ensuring that the 
drug’s efficacy meets some minimum threshold (unless “zero 
efficacy” is considered to be a threshold), but to proving to a 
reasonable certainty that there is any efficacy at all.61  
C. The Concepts of Evidence and Efficacy Are Often Conflated 
The distinction between substantial evidence and substantial 
efficacy has not always been appreciated, even by those prominent 
in the field. David Kessler, for example, during his term as FDA 
Commissioner, expressed concern over a Congressional bill that 
would “explicitly lower the efficacy standard” in that it would allow 
a new drug to be approved based only on a single clinical trial 
rather than two clinical trials.62 As just discussed, the number of 
                                                                                                     
 58. Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 
105-115, § 115(a), 111 Stat. 2296 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355(d)). 
 59. See Adequate and Well-Controlled Studies, 21 C.F.R. § 126(b)(2) (2013) 
(“An adequate and well-controlled study . . . uses a design that permits a valid 
comparison with a control to provide a quantitative assessment of drug effect.” 
(emphasis added)).  
 60. See Matthew Wynia & David Boren, Better Regulation of Industry-
Sponsored Clinical Trials Is Long Overdue, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 410, 411 
(2009) (“For instance, it might take a billion dollars and ten years or more to 
bring a drug through testing to market . . . .”). 
 61. Safety, of course, must also be a concern. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.124(d) 
(2013) (“The petitioner shall include in the petition information to show that the 
drug product was approved for safety and effectiveness . . . .”).  
 62. FDA Reform Legislation: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health and 
Env’t of the H. Comm. on Commerce, 104th Cong. 40 (1996) (statement of David 
A. Kessler, M.D., Comm’r of Food & Drugs).  
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clinical trials relates to the evidence standard and not to any 
efficacy standard.63 Similarly, a New Jersey court noted that 
“[d]rugs approved between 1938 and 1962 were reevaluated [via 
DESI] to ensure compliance with the efficacy standard.”64 DESI, as 
discussed above,65 examined only the substantiality of the evidence 
of efficacy and did not seek to ensure that the drugs had any 
particular level of efficacy.66 
The distinction between substantial evidence (what the 
standard is) and substantial efficacy (what the standard perhaps 
ought to be), is reminiscent of the classic distinction made by 
scientists—and often conflated by laypersons—between the term 
“precise” and the term “accurate.”67 Scientists traditionally use a 
dartboard analogy to illustrate the difference: if all darts land close 
to each other, but far from the bull’s eye of the dartboard, the darts 
have been thrown with precision, but they have not been thrown 
accurately.68 See Figure 1 below: 
                                                                                                     
 63. See supra Part II.B (discussing the evidence–efficacy dichotomy).  
 64. Bailey v. Wyeth, Inc., 37 A.3d 549, 555 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law. Div. 2008).  
 65. See supra notes 47–60 and accompanying text (discussing DESI in more 
depth). 
 66. Some commentators have also conflated the efficacy standard with the 
evidence standard. See, e.g., Jennifer Kulynych, Will FDA Relinquish the “Gold 
Standard” for New Drug Approval? Redefining “Substantial Evidence” in the 
FDA Modernization Act of 1997, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 127, 137–38 (1999) 
(“CBER reviewers are said to apply the effectiveness standard less rigidly than 
their CDER counterparts . . . on the basis of a single clinical trial.”). 
 67. See AULAY MACKENZIE, MATHEMATICS AND STATISTICS FOR LIFE 
SCIENTISTS 4 (2005) (“Unfortunately, the terms ‘accuracy’ and ‘precision’ are 
often colloquially used interchangeably, but the distinction in scientific use is 
important.”). 
 68. See, e.g., B. ANTONISAMY ET AL., BIOSTATISTICS: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 
228 (2010) (“Often, a dartboard analogy . . . is . . . used to understand the 
difference between accuracy and precision.”).  
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Figure 1: FDA Efficacy Standards Using the Dartboard Analogy69 
Patients want drugs that reach reasonable efficacy targets, or, 
to use the language of the preceding analogy, a drug whose efficacy 
is accurate.70 What the legal standard requires, however, is a drug 
whose efficacy is precise.71 This is hardly a distinction that the 
average doctor likely considers on a daily basis, and is unlikely to 
be one that the average patient pauses to think about at all.72 
Nevertheless, it is an important distinction to make in order to 
ensure that patients, physicians, and others are not misled into 
believing mistakenly that regulatory evidence standards ensure 
that only drugs with high levels of efficacy are approved.73  
                                                                                                     
 69. This is the classic bull’s-eye dartboard analogy depicting accuracy 
versus precision. 
 70. See supra notes 67–69 and accompanying text (illustrating the widely 
accepted “dartboard analogy”). 
 71. See SHAYNE COX GAD, CLINICAL TRIALS HANDBOOK 442 (2009) (noting 
that it is the confidence interval, and not the p-value per se, that is a measure of 
precision).  
 72. Physicians may be less informed about drug efficacy than is commonly 
believed. See FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN. & DIV. OF MED. SCIES. NAT’L RESEARCH 
COUNCIL, DRUG EFFICACY STUDY: FINAL REPORT TO THE COMMISSIONER OF FOOD 
AND DRUGS 65 (1969) [hereinafter DESI FINAL REPORT] (alluding to “prescribing 
doctors who were not in a position of knowledge” with respect to actual drug 
efficacy and were therefore heavily influenced by advertising); see also Ben 
Goldacre, What Doctors Don’t Know About the Drugs They Prescribe, TEDTALK 
(Apr. 5, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ben-goldacre/prescription-
drugs_b_3018272.html?icid=maing-grid7|main5|dl30|sec 
1_lnk3%26pLid%3D295315 (last visited Oct. 21, 2013) (noting that physicians 
would be “misled” due to publication bias, even if they were to review the 
literature) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 73. If academic institutions were to operate under legal standards 
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III. The Gold Standard and New Drug Approval 
The very term “gold standard” evokes feelings of confidence 
and certainty. As one dictionary defines it, the gold standard is 
“the best, most reliable, or most prestigious thing of its type.”74 
Certainly, if one were measuring something as important as drug 
efficacy, it would be desirable to use such a pristine and highly 
regarded standard, and the relevant FDA regulations do not 
disappoint. These regulations incorporate, as a general matter, all 
of the essential elements normally considered to be part of the gold 
standard, as will be explained next.75 
A. FDA Regulations Generally Define “Adequate and Well-
Controlled Investigations” According to the Gold Standard 
Although the term “gold standard” is not used anywhere in the 
federal statute or in the accompanying regulations, the section of 
the regulations entitled “adequate and well-controlled studies” sets 
forth the three elements generally understood to constitute the 
core of the gold standard for clinical trials: randomization, double-
blind administration, and placebo-control.76  
                                                                                                     
analogous to those that bind the FDA, a student could pass a course with a 
failing grade so long as test results provided “substantial evidence”—to 
acceptable levels of certainty—that the student’s grasp of the course material 
was slightly above absolute incompetence. To extend the analogy, professors 
would then provide these marginal students with glowing letters of 
recommendation and insist that any future employer compensate them at 
exorbitant annual salaries. These annual salaries would be so high that in some 
cases they could only be paid with the help of government-regulated third 
parties who would provide at least partial reimbursement to the employers. If 
those third parties refused to pay, in light of the student’s (now graduate’s) test 
results, those third parties would be condemned as being cold and calculating, 
or even immoral. The analogy would be absurd and worthy of summary 
dismissal were it not so suggestive of what actually occurs with 
pharmaceuticals. 
 74. Gold Standard Definition, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, http://oxford 
dictionaries.com/definition/gold%2Bstandard?region=us (last visited Sept. 8, 
2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 75. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.126 (2013) (containing the elements of the scientific 
gold standard: randomization, double-blind administration, and placebo 
control). For an explanation of the gold standard elements, see infra Part III.A.  
 76. See, e.g., FTC v. QT, Inc., 448 F. Supp. 2d 908, 938 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (“Dr. 
Feldstein agrees that a double-blind, placebo-controlled, randomized trial is the 
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According to the regulations, “adequate and well-controlled 
studies,” more commonly known as clinical trials, must “us[e] a 
design that permits a valid comparison with a control to provide a 
quantitative assessment of drug effect.”77 That is, study 
participants taking the new drug must be compared to a scientific 
“control” group, which in its most basic form consists of patients 
taking an inactive placebo, the appearance of which is 
indistinguishable from the active treatment.78 The purpose of 
placebo control (combined with blinding, discussed below)79 is to 
address response bias, which is the tendency of study participants 
to respond because they believe they are being treated.80 The use of 
placebo thus helps to determine the extent of the effect caused by 
the chemical composition of the drug itself.81 Note that, although 
the regulations indicate that the drug effect should be assessable 
quantitatively, there is no minimum quantum of effect required.82 
In other words, efficacy must be measured, but it need not be 
measured against any standard (other than zero).  
Researchers in clinical trials must ensure more generally 
that “[a]dequate measures are taken to minimize bias on the part 
of the subjects, observers, and analysts of the data.”83 The most 
common means for avoiding bias, and the one specifically 
                                                                                                     
‘gold standard’ in the scientific community . . . .”); DAVID MISCHOULON & 
JERROLD F. ROSENBAUM, NATURAL MEDICINES FOR PSYCHIATRIC DISORDERS 12 
(2008) (“Double-blind, placebo-controlled, randomized clinical trials (RCTs) have 
been the gold standard of clinical research for several decades.”); David W. 
Barnes, General Acceptance Versus Scientific Soundness: Mad Scientists in the 
Courtroom, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 303, 320 (2004) (“The gold standard for 
experimental testing that will yield an error rate measuring reliability is the 
randomized, controlled, double-masked study.” (emphasis in original)). 
 77. 21 C.F.R. § 314.126(b)(2) (2013).  
 78. Laura Lee Johnson et al., An Introduction to Biostatistics: 
Randomization, Hypothesis Testing, and Sample Size Estimation, in PRINCIPLES 
AND PRACTICE OF CLINICAL RESEARCH 165, 167 (John I. Gallin & Frederick P. 
Ognibene eds., 2d ed. 2007). 
 79. See infra notes 83–96 and accompanying text (discussing placebo 
control and blind testing).  
 80. Johnson et al., supra note 78, at 167. 
 81. Id. at 165–67. 
 82. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.126(b)(2) (2013) (neglecting to set a minimum 
quantitative efficacy level). 
 83. Id. § 314.126(b)(5).  
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mentioned in the regulations, is “blinding,”84 sometimes referred to 
as “masking.”85 A “single-blind” study involves taking measures to 
ensure that patients do not know whether they are receiving the 
active treatment or the placebo treatment, which helps avoid 
response bias.86 The more highly regarded “double-blind” study 
involves utilizing a protocol that ensures that neither the patient 
nor the treating researcher knows whether the active or placebo 
treatment is being administered.87 Blinding the researcher helps to 
avoid observer bias, a type of bias introduced when the researcher 
manages, treats, or assesses an outcome differently depending on 
whether the researcher believes an active treatment is being 
administered.88 While most trials follow the double-blind 
approach,89 some trials follow a “triple-blind” approach in which 
members of the committee that monitors the patient responses are 
also unaware of which patients are receiving the treatment.90  
A third characteristic of adequate and well-controlled 
investigations, as defined by the FDA regulations, is that patients 
must be assigned to treatment or placebo groups so as to minimize 
bias.91 The regulations note that minimizing bias is “ordinarily” 
achieved by “randomization,” that is, assigning patients randomly 
                                                                                                     
 84. Id.  
 85. MIQUEL S. PORTA, A DICTIONARY OF EPIDEMIOLOGY (Oxford Univ. Press 
2008) (“To avoid confusion about the meaning of the word blind, some authors 
prefer to describe such studies as masked.”).  
 86. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN & CURT D. FURBERG, FUNDAMENTALS OF 
CLINICAL TRIALS 120–21 (2010). 
 87. Id. at 122 (“The main advantage of a truly double-blind study is that 
the risk of bias is reduced.”). 
 88. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., INT’L CONF. ON HARMONIZATION, GUIDANCE 
FOR INDUSTRY: E 10 CHOICE OF CONTROL GROUP AND RELATED ISSUES IN CLINICAL 
TRIALS 4 (2001). See Bradley Evanoff, Reducing Bias, in TRANSLATIONAL AND 
EXPERIMENTAL CLINICAL RESEARCH 67, 68–69 (Daniel P. Schuster & William J. 
Powers eds., 2005) (discussing various types of bias and techniques to counter 
them). 
 89. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., INT’L CONF. ON HARMONIZATION, 
GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: E 9 STATISTICAL PRINCIPLES FOR CLINICAL TRIALS 10 
(1998) (“Most . . . trials follow a double-blind approach . . . .”).  
 90. See FRIEDMAN & FURBERG, supra note 86, at 123 (“A triple-blind study is 
an extension of the double-blind design; the committee monitoring response 
variables is not told the identity of the groups.”). 
 91. 21 C.F.R. § 314.126(b)(4) (2013). 
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to either the treatment group or the control group.92 
Randomization helps to counter selection bias, which occurs when 
nonrandom selection results in active and control groups that are 
not statistically representative of the population under study.93 In 
the case of clinical trials, for example, selection bias could occur if 
patients placed on active treatment (i.e., the drug being tested) are 
on average more severely afflicted with disease, or more 
susceptible to treatment, than are those in the control group. 
Randomization helps to ensure against such bias.94 
The regulations thus make reference to all three core elements 
of the gold standard, and these three elements help to counter a 
number of biases that can undermine the validity of trial 
outcomes.95 Figure 2 summarizes these elements and the biases 
they are designed to address. Note that even the total elimination 
of these biases does not necessarily imply any minimum threshold 
of drug efficacy. Instead, mitigating bias helps to ensure that 
results are correct, regardless of whether the results reveal great 
efficacy, little efficacy, no efficacy, or even negative efficacy (i.e., 
harm). 
Figure 2: Research Biases and Means of Addressing Them96 
 
 
B. FDA Regulations Do Not Necessarily Require the Gold Standard 
Although FDA regulations describe the three main elements of 
the gold standard in defining “adequate and well-controlled 
                                                                                                     
 92. Id.  
 93. Ian S. Lustick, History, Historiography, and Political Science: Multiple 
Historical Records and the Problem of Selection Bias, 90 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 605, 
606 (1996). 
 94. See Johnson et al., supra note 78, at 167. 
 95. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.126(b) (2013) (requiring randomization, blinding, 
and placebo control). 
 96. See generally supra Part II.A. 
Problem Regulatory Solution  
Biases, e.g. 
• Selection bias 
• Observer bias 




• Placebo control 
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investigations,”97 the regulations contain considerable flexibility 
and new drugs can in fact be approved without being subjected to 
gold-standard testing.98 For example, although placebo-control is 
usually considered to be a key element of the gold standard, the 
regulations specifically contemplate the use of other types of 
controls, including: (1) “dose-comparison” controls, where patients 
are divided into groups and given different doses of the drug being 
tested;99 (2) “active treatment” controls, where the control group is 
given a different active ingredient (such as a previously-approved 
alternate drug) from that of the test group;100 (3) “no treatment” 
controls, reserved for cases where objective measurements of 
efficacy are available;101 and (4) “historical” controls, where data 
from the test group is compared to historical data of patients not 
associated with the current trial.102 “Uncontrolled” studies are 
specifically noted to be unacceptable.103 
The FDA regulations also allow flexibility with respect to both 
blinding and randomization.104 These techniques are offered in the 
regulations as examples of means to avoid bias, but they are not 
indicated as requirements.105 Moreover, even if they were 
nominally required, the regulations provide that the Director for 
the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER, a division of 
the FDA) “may . . . waive in whole or in part any of the criteria 
                                                                                                     
 97. 21 C.F.R. § 314.126 (2013). 
 98. See infra notes 99–107 and accompanying text (discussing the 
flexibility of the testing process under the current regulations).  
 99. 21 C.F.R. § 314.126(b)(2)(ii).  
 100. Id. § 314.126(b)(2)(iv). 
 101. Id. § 314.126(b)(2)(iii).  
 102. Id. § 314.126(b)(2)(v). 
 103. Id. § 314.126(e).  
 104. See id. § 314.126(b)(2)(i) (“A placebo-controlled study . . . usually 
includes randomization and blinding . . . .” (emphasis added)); id. 
§ 314.126(b)(2)(ii) (“Dose comparison trials usually include randomization and 
blinding . . . .” (emphasis added)); id. § 314.126(b)(2)(iii) (“No treatment 
concurrent control trials usually include randomization.” (emphasis added)); id. 
§ 314.126(b)(2)(iv) (“Active treatment trials usually include randomization and 
blinding . . . .” (emphasis added)); id. § 314.126(b)(5) (offering “blinding” as an 
example of a measure taken to avoid bias); id. § 314.126(b)(4) (“Ordinarily, in a 
concurrently controlled study, assignment is by randomization . . . .” (emphasis 
added)). 
 105. Id. § 314.126(b)(2)(i). 
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[i.e., placebo-control, randomization, and blinding] . . . either prior 
to the investigation or in the evaluation of a completed study.”106  
The flexibility provided by the regulations is not necessarily a 
cause for concern. New drugs are submitted to the FDA under a 
wide variety of circumstances, and flexibility is therefore needed to 
appropriately tailor clinical trials to each drug and disease against 
which it is being tested.107 At the same time, the brief review just 
presented makes clear that not all new drugs are necessarily 
subjected to gold standard testing. The important point, however, 
is that even if all new drugs were subject to the gold standard, that 
standard would not be sufficient to ensure that only meaningfully 
effective drugs reached the market. 
IV. The Gold Standard Does Not Ensure Substantial Efficacy 
The most significant weakness of the gold standard is not that 
the standard may not always be required,108 but the insufficiency 
of the gold standard itself. There are two reasons for this 
insufficiency. First, the statistical framework supporting the gold 
standard does not account for the possibility that drug companies 
may undertake multiple trials until one or more of them 
demonstrates efficacy.109 Second, and more importantly, the 
standard is inadequate because its statistical framework requires 
no particular level of efficacy.110 All that is required is reasonable 
                                                                                                     
 106. Id. § 314.126(c).  
 107. See generally Barry S. Roberts & Sara M. Biggers, Regulatory Update: 
The FDA Speeds Up Hope for the Desperately Ill and Dying, 27 AM. BUS. L.J. 403 
(1989) (arguing that an experimental drug to treat AIDS during the 1980s 
benefited from the flexibility of the clinical trial process mandated by the FDA). 
 108. In some cases, insisting on the gold standard would be unethical. For 
example, when testing a new drug against a deadly condition for which there is 
already an effective treatment, it would be unethical to condemn half of the 
patients in the clinical trial to a placebo group. Instead, the existing treatment 
could be used as a comparator. 
 109. Each controlled clinical study pertinent to a proposed use of a new drug 
must be submitted to the FDA as part of a New Drug Application. 21 C.F.R 
§ 314.50(d)(5) (2013). Thus, although companies cannot “cherry-pick” the two 
best trials to submit to the FDA while withholding others from its consideration, 
the FDA may approve a drug based upon two positive clinical trials 
notwithstanding that additional trials known to the FDA failed to show 
promising results. See infra Part V.C. 
 110. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.126(b)(2) (2013) (neglecting to set a minimum 
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certainty as to the existence of any level of efficacy.111 Each of these 
shortcomings is explored in turn. 
A. The Gold Standard Does Not Prevent the Undertaking of 
Multiple Trials 
Each year, hundreds of clinical trials are undertaken with the 
hope that favorable results can be used to win FDA approval.112 At 
a statistical certainty level of p=.05 (and assuming a one-tailed 
distribution),113 the FDA could expect that one in every twenty 
trials would be positive, even if all of the drugs tested had no 
efficacy whatsoever.114 Such periodic “false positives,” or Type I 
errors, are due to the natural random variation of clinical trial 
results combined with the tolerances that are inherent in the 
statistical measurements.115 In order to reduce the possibility that 
a drug is approved based on a Type I error, the statute generally 
requires drug sponsors to conduct two clinical trials rather than 
one.116 Assuming those clinical trials are unbiased and 
independent, the two-trial requirement reduces the chance of a 
Type I error from one in twenty to one in four hundred,117 
substantially reducing but still not eliminating the chance that a 
                                                                                                     
quantitative efficacy level); supra Part III (evaluating the elements of the 
scientific gold standard as required by the FDA in clinical drug trials). 
 111. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.126(b)(2) (2013) (neglecting to set a minimum 
quantitative efficacy level); supra Part II (evaluating the level of efficacy 
required by standard clinical trials). 
 112. FDA GUIDANCE, supra note 55, at 5. 
 113. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., INT’L CONF. ON HARMONIZATION, 
GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: E9 STATISTICAL PRINCIPLES FOR CLINICAL TRIALS 32 
(1998), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryIn 
formation/Guidances/ucm073137.pdf (noting that “[t]he issue of one-sided or 
two-sided approaches to inference is controversial, and a diversity of views can 
be found in the statistical literature”). 
 114. FDA GUIDANCE, supra note 55, at 5, n.5. 
 115. Id. at 31–32. 
 116. Id. at 5 (“Confirmatory trials are intended to provide firm evidence in 
support of claims; hence adherence to protocols and standard operating 
procedures is particularly important.”). 
 117. The figure of one in four hundred is calculated as the product of the p-
values of each individual trial, or 1 in 400 assuming a p-value of .05 (that is: 
0.05 * 0.05 = .0025, or 1 in 400). 
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drug under investigation will appear to be effective when in fact it 
is not.  
A larger challenge, however, derives not from statistical 
uncertainty, which can never be absolutely eliminated, but from 
the deliberate actions of study sponsors. In theory, a drug sponsor 
could simply run clinical trials in sequence, stopping only after two 
positive trials have been accumulated.118 Although drug sponsors 
must submit pertinent information from all studies to the FDA as 
part of the New Drug Application process,119 data from the two 
trials showing statistically significant results could be relied upon 
by the FDA as substantial evidence of efficacy in order to approve 
the drug under the applicable legal standard, notwithstanding its 
knowledge of less flattering data from other trials.120 The 
requirements of the gold standard itself do not stand in the way of 
such multiple sequential trials.121 The fact that the FDA can 
approve new drugs after two positive trials are accumulated, even 
though other trials failed to show efficacy, is entirely consistent 
with the intent of Congress as expressed in the 1962 Senate Report 
quoted above: drugs may be approved “even though there may be 
preponderant evidence to the contrary based upon equally reliable 
studies.”122 More generally, it is consistent with the substantial 
                                                                                                     
 118. See MELODY PETERSON, OUR DAILY MEDS: HOW THE PHARMACEUTICAL 
COMPANIES TRANSFORMED THEMSELVES INTO SLICK MARKETING MACHINES AND 
HOOKED THE NATION ON PRESCRIPTION DRUGS 49 (2008) (“[T]he sponsor could just 
do studies until the cows come home until he gets two of them that are 
statistically significant by chance alone . . . .”). 
 119. See 21 C.F.R § 314.50(d)(5) (2013) (describing the requirements of the 
New Drug Application process); 21 C.F.R. § 314.125(b)(14) (2013) (“The [FDA] 
will refuse to approve the application . . . if . . . [t]he application does not contain 
an explanation of the omission of a report of any investigation of the drug 
product sponsored by the applicant, or . . . of other [pertinent] information.”). 
 120. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (2012) (“[D]ata from one adequate and well-
controlled clinical investigation and confirmatory evidence . . . are sufficient to 
establish effectiveness . . . .”). 
 121. Supra Parts II–IV. 
 122. S. REP. NO. 87-1744, at 16 (1962), reprinted in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2884, 
2892 (emphasis added). The Senate Report continued:  
There may also be a situation in which a new drug has been studied 
in a limited number of hospitals and clinics and its effectiveness 
established only to the satisfaction of a few investigators qualified to 
use it. There may be many physicians who would deny the 
effectiveness simply on the basis of a disbelief growing out of their 
past experience with other drugs or with the diseases involved. 
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evidence standard, which requires less than a preponderance of 
the evidence, as discussed above.123 
1. Using Multiple Trials to Obtain Drug Approval: The 
Antidepressants 
At least some borderline-ineffective medicines appear to have 
been approved by undertaking multiple trials until sufficient 
positive evidence is accumulated. Irving Kirsch and a group of 
scholars at the University of Connecticut and the George 
Washington School of Public Health used the federal Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA) to obtain data from clinical trials of the six 
most widely prescribed depression medicines.124 Given the legal 
requirement that two favorable trials be submitted to the FDA to 
satisfy the substantial evidence standard, one might expect the 
FOIA request to have yielded data from the twelve trials necessary 
to obtain FDA approval.125 In fact, the FOIA request submitted by 
Kirsch and his colleagues uncovered an astonishing forty-seven 
randomized and placebo controlled efficacy trials for the six 
medicines in question: five trials each for fluoxetine (Prozac) and 
citalopram (Celex); six for venlafaxine (Effexor); seven for 
                                                                                                     
Again, the studies may show that the drug will help a substantial 
percentage of the patients in a given disease condition but will not be 
effective in other cases. What the committee intends is to permit the 
claim for this new drug to be made to the medical profession with a 
proper explanation of the basis on which it rests. 
Id.; see also Karen Baswell, Note, Time for a Change: Why the FDA Should 
Require Greater Disclosure of Differences of Opinion on the Safety and Efficacy 
of Approved Drugs, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1799, 1826 (2007) (interpreting the 
Senate Report to mean that, under the standard expressed in that Report, 
“differences in opinion would always be resolved in favor of drug approval”).  
 123. See supra Part II (discussing the evidentiary standard).  
 124. Irving Kirsch et al., The Emperor’s New Drugs: An Analysis of 
Antidepressant Medication Data Submitted to the U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration, 5 PREVENTION & TREATMENT, no. 1, 2008, at 3 [hereinafter 
Kirsch et al., Emperor’s], http://alphachoices.com/repository/assets/pdf/Emperors 
NewDrugs.pdf.  
 125. See Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. 
No. 105-115, § 115(a), 111 Stat. 2296 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355(d)) (“[D]ata 
from one adequate and well-controlled clinical investigation and confirmatory 
evidence . . . are sufficient to establish effectiveness . . . .”). 
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sertraline (Zoloft); eight for nefazodone (Serzone); and sixteen for 
paroxetine (Paxil).126  
While there may have been legitimate reasons for conducting 
the plethora of clinical trials observed by Kirsch et al.,127 the data 
they report suggest one obvious possibility, namely, that many of 
the trials were not as favorable as the clinical researchers had 
hoped.128 Earlier work by Kirsch and Guy Sapirstein that relied on 
studies that had been published suggested that at least 75% of the 
benefit supposedly due to the antidepressants was also seen in the 
placebo group.129 According to Kirsch, the data from the 
unpublished studies uncovered via the FOIA request cast an even 
darker shadow over the efficacy claims of the depression 
medications: “More than half of the clinical trials [of 
antidepressants] sponsored by the pharmaceutical companies 
showed no significant difference at all between drug and 
placebo.”130 Although Kirsch and his colleagues advocate caution in 
interpreting the results, they note that the data “suggest that the 
effect[s] of antidepressant drugs are very small and of questionable 
                                                                                                     
 126. Id.; see also Eric H. Turner et al., Selective Publication of 
Antidepressant Trials and Its Influence on Apparent Efficacy, 358 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 252, 256 (2008) (examining seventy-four FDA-registered studies of twelve 
depression medications and concluding that thirty-seven of the thirty-eight 
positive studies were published while, of the negative studies, twenty-two were 
not published and eleven were published in a way that misleadingly “conveyed a 
positive outcome”).  
 127. See, e.g., FDA GUIDANCE, supra note 55, at 6 (1998) (noting that 
multiple trials may be conducted in order “to find an appropriate dose, to study 
patients of greater and lesser complexity or severity of disease, to compare the 
drug to other therapy, to study an adequate number of patients for safety 
purposes,” and to otherwise study a drug). 
 128. Infra notes 129–30 and accompanying text. 
 129. See Irving Kirsch & Guy Sapirstein, Listening to Prozac but Hearing 
Placebo: A Meta-Analysis of Antidepressant Medication, 1 PREVENTION & 
TREATMENT, no. 2, 1998, Article 2a (comparing the effects of active drugs and 
placebos). 
 130. Irving Kirsch, Antidepressants: The Emperor’s New Drugs?, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 20, 2010, 1:35 PM) [hereinafter Kirsch, 
Antidepressants], http://www.huffingtonpost.com/irving-kirsch-phd/antidepress 
ants-the-emper_b_442205.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2013) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Arif Khan et al., Severity of 
Depression and Response to Antidepressants and Placebo: An Analysis of the 
Food and Drug Administration Database, 22 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 
40 (2002) (analyzing the relationship between the severity of depression 
symptoms and clinical trial results). 
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clinical significance.”131 Kirsch, now a faculty member at Harvard 
Medical School,132 would later share his findings with the broader 
public in his book The Emperor’s New Drugs: Exploding the 
Antidepressant Myth.133 
2. The Larger Phenomenon: Publication Bias 
The selective use of multiple trials to obtain drug approval is 
part of a larger phenomenon of publication bias, i.e., where studies 
with positive results are more likely to be published than studies 
with negative or inconclusive results.134 Critics have warned of 
publication bias for decades.135 An influential 1988 paper by 
researchers at the Dana-Farber Cancer Institute surveyed the 
literature on publication bias and concluded that “the problem [of 
publication bias] is indeed a serious one.”136 The following year, 
some of the same researchers attempted to quantify the magnitude 
of publication bias in published cancer clinical trials, concluding 
that small studies are more prone to bias than larger ones and 
finding the bias to be very large.137 Small trials might be more 
subject to publication bias in part because their small size makes 
their non-publication less likely to attract notice. In addition, the 
lower cost of small trials means that it is easier to shine a media 
spotlight on favorable ones and simply write off negative trials as a 
                                                                                                     
 131. Kirsch et al., Emperor’s, supra note 124, at 8; see also id. at 10 
(“[C]linical significance is dubious.”).  
 132. Program in Placebo Studies & Therapeutic Encounter (PiPS), Our 
Team, http://programinplacebostudies.org/about/people/ (last visited Sept. 21, 
2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 133. IRVING KIRSCH, THE EMPEROR’S NEW DRUGS: EXPLODING THE 
ANTIDEPRESSANT MYTH (2010). 
 134. See I. Peterson, Publication Bias: Looking for Missing Data, SCI. NEWS, 
Jan. 7, 1989, at 5 (1989) (discussing disproportionate publication of studies with 
positive results and suggestions for reform). 
 135. Infra note 136 and accompanying text. 
 136. Colin B. Begg & Jesse A. Berlin, Publication Bias: A Problem in 
Interpreting Medical Data, 151 J. ROYAL STAT. SOC’Y [SERIES A] 419, 421 (1988); 
see also Goldacre, infra note 148 (discussing the effects of publication bias on 
doctors, patients, and the industry in general). 
 137. See Jesse A. Berlin et al., An Assessment of Publication Bias Using a 
Sample of Published Clinical Trials, 84 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N 381, 391 (1989) (“The 
results appear to confirm that small studies are more prone to bias and that the 
bias is substantial . . . .”). 
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cost of doing business. Statistically, small trials tend to vary more 
in outcome and therefore are more likely than large trials to 
sometimes produce misleadingly favorable results.138 
3. Statutory Attempts to Address Publication Bias 
Concerns about the use of multiple trials to game the system 
were ostensibly addressed by legislation that mandated increased 
transparency of clinical trials. The Food and Drug Administration 
Modernization Act of 1997 (FDAMA)139 tasked the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services with the creation of a publicly-
accessible data bank of clinical trials of drugs for serious or life-
threatening diseases or conditions.140 The data bank is now 
available at ClinicalTrials.gov.141 In 2007, the Food and Drug 
Administration Amendments Act (FDAAA) significantly expanded 
the scope of the data bank such that it now includes clinical trials 
for drugs treating other than serious or life-threatening diseases or 
conditions.142 Both federally and privately funded trials are 
required to be reported,143 including many trials that are 
conducted overseas.144 The rationale behind this legislation is that 
                                                                                                     
 138. See id. at 391 (evaluating the effect of small sample size on generating 
positive clinical trial results). 
 139. Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 
105-115, § 113, 111 Stat. 2296 (1997) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 282 
(2012)). 
 140. Id. § 113, 111 Stat. at 2311. 
 141. The European Union maintains a similar database called EudraCT 
(European Union Drug Regulating Authorities Clinical Trials). EU CLINICAL 
TRIALS REGISTER, https://www.clinicaltrialsregister.eu (last visited Oct. 21, 2013) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 142. See Tamsen Valoir & Shubha Ghosh, FDA Preemption of Drug & Device 
Labeling: Who Should Decide What Goes on a Drug Label?, 21 HEALTH MATRIX 
555, 589–90 (2011) (citing Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 
2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85, § 801(a), 121 Stat. 823 (2007)). 
 143. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR THE INDUSTRY: INFORMATION 
PROGRAM ON CLINICAL TRIALS FOR SERIOUS OR LIFE-THREATENING DISEASES AND 
CONDITIONS 2 (2002), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/regulatoryinformation/gui 
dances/ucm126838.pdf (citing the FDA Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 
105-115, § 113, 111 Stat. 2296 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 282(j)(3)(A)) 
(2012)). 
 144. See id. at 6 (discussing reporting requirements for overseas clinical 
trials of investigational new drugs). 
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if clinical trials are registered before results are obtained, it will be 
more difficult to hide unfavorable trial results.145 
Unfortunately, ClinicalTrials.gov has in practice proven far 
less effective than the rhetoric suggests, or even than the law 
requires. According to a 2012 study in the British Medical Journal, 
almost four out of five clinical trials covered by FDAAA that should 
have been reported on ClinicalTrials.gov were not.146 Despite what 
appear to be flagrant violations of the law and authorized penalties 
of up to $10,000 per day,147 the New York Times recently reported 
that, “[a]mazingly, no fine has yet been levied.”148  
Efforts outside of FDAAA to address selective publication have 
met with similarly limited success. A 2004 policy announcement by 
the International Committee of Medical Journal Editors—an 
organization whose membership includes the New England 
Journal of Medicine, the Journal of the American Medical 
Association, and other leading publishers of clinical trial 
results149—to refrain from publishing papers that are based upon 
                                                                                                     
 145. See 153 Cong. Rec. S1411-02, S1448 (Jan. 31, 2007) (statement of 
Christopher Dodd) (“We owe it to patients to make sure that their participation 
in a trial will benefit other individuals suffering from the same illness or 
condition by making the results of the trial public, no matter the outcome of the 
trial.”). 
 146. See Andrew P. Prayle et al., Compliance with Mandatory Reporting of 
Clinical Trial Results on ClinicalTrials.gov: Cross Sectional Study, 344 BRIT. 
MED. J. d7373, at 3 (Jan. 3, 2012) (stating that approximately 78% of trials from 
2009 were not reported); see also Kay Dickersin & Drummond Rennie, The 
Evolution of Trial Registries and Their Use to Assess the Clinical Trial 
Enterprise, 307 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1861, 1861 (2012) (“[T]rial investigators . . . 
largely ignored any legal requirement to register [under FDAMA].”); Fiona 
Godlee, Research Misconduct Is Widespread and Harms Patients, 344 BRIT. 
MED. J. e14 (Jan. 5, 2012) (emphasizing reporting bias and suppression); Joseph 
S. Ross et al., Publication of NIH Funded Trials Registered in 
ClinicalTrials.gov: Cross Sectional Analysis, 344 BRIT. MED. J. d7292, at 3 (Jan. 
3, 2012), http://www.bmj.com/content/344/bmj.d7292.pdf%2Bhtml (finding that a 
third of NIH funded trials remain unpublished more than three years after 
study completion). 
 147. 21 U.S.C. § 333(f)(3)(B) (2012).  
 148. Ben Goldacre, Health Care’s Trick Coin, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2013, at 
A23.  
 149. Int’l Comm. Med. J. Editors, About the International Committee of 
Medical Journal Editors, ICMJE, http://www.icmje.org/about.html (last visited 
Sept. 21, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
PHARMACEUTICAL EFFICACY 2103 
unregistered studies,150 has not been adequately followed by 
journal editors themselves.151  
Earlier in 2004, New York State attorney general Eliot Spitzer 
had sued GlaxoSmithKline alleging that it fraudulently concealed 
negative efficacy (and safety) data about antidepressant Paxil 
(paroxetine) through selective publication.152 Glaxo’s stock was 
pushed down by 3.2%,153 likely based more on anticipated court 
damages or fines rather than on any anticipated decrease in 
sales;154 sales of Paxil remained over $200 million per year.155 In 
2012, Glaxo finally paid $3 billion in fines to settle criminal and 
civil charges over sales and marketing practices related to several 
of its drugs, including Paxil,156 but less than a third of this amount 
                                                                                                     
 150. See Catherine D. DeAngelis et al., Clinical Trial Registration: A 
Statement From the International Committee of Medical Journal Editors, 292 J. 
AM. MED. ASS’N 1363 (2004) (discussing registration of trials as a requirement 
for publication in their journals); see also Int’l Comm. Med. J. Editors, 
Obligation to Register Clinical Trials, ICMJE, http://www. 
icmje.org/publishing_10regi ster.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2013) (setting forth 
the current policy) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 151. See Sylvain Mathieu et al., Comparison of Registered and Published 
Primary Outcomes in Randomized Controlled Trials, 302 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 977, 
981 (2009) (noting that fewer than half of trials were adequately registered, and 
more than a quarter were unregistered).  
 152. Gardiner Harris, Spitzer Sues a Drug Maker, Saying It Hid Negative 
Data, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2004, at A1. See generally Abigail Kagle, Driven to 
Settle: Elliot Spitzer v. GlaxoSmithKline and Undisclosed Trial Data Regarding 
Paxil (unpublished student paper) (on file with the Columbia Law School 
Attorney General Program), http://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/ 
microsites/attorneys-general/files/Eliot-Spitzer-v-GlaxoSmithKline.pdf.  
 153. Kagle, supra note 152, at 26. 
 154. See GLAXOSMITHKLINE PLC, ANNUAL REPORT 2004, 120 (Mar. 4, 2005), 
http://www.gsk.com/content/dam/gsk/globals/documents/pdf/annual-report-
2004.pdf (noting that the New York State lawsuit was settled in August 2004 
but that “similar cases, some of which purport to be class actions, have been 
filed in state and federal courts”); id. at 145 (noting that impairments of £633 
million were recorded following the launch in the U.S. of a generic version of 
Paxil). 
 155. See Aaron Smith, Suicide Label Unlikely to Squeeze Glaxo Sales, CNN 
MONEY (May 12, 2006, 1:28 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2006/05/12/news/ 
companies/paxil/index.htm (last visited Sept. 21, 2013) (noting sales of Paxil and 
Paxil CR totaled $242 million in 2005) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). These sales levels were achieved notwithstanding the entry of 
generic competition to Paxil in September 2003. See ANNUAL REPORT OF 2004, 
supra note 154, at 79 (noting decreased pharmaceutical turnover in the United 
States after September 2003). 
 156. Katie Thomas & Michael S. Schmidt, Glaxo Agrees to Pay $3 Billion in 
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would stem from Paxil (paroxetine), a product that has earned 
Glaxo at least $11.6 billion.157 
Unfortunately, the public’s conscience seems to be less 
sensitive to questionable but important selective publication 
practices than to the lurid personal dalliances of those attempting 
to check such practices: Spitzer, a consumer protection champion, 
was exposed in 2008 as a client in a prostitution scandal and 
charged under a century-old federal law that is rarely invoked 
against prostitution clients,158 thus ending his otherwise admirable 
career as a public advocate.159 At the same time, even billions of 
dollars in fines do not seem to be deterring misconduct.160 Because 
“[t]he benefits of aggressive marketing often outweigh the cost of 
settlements,” even those in the billion-dollar range, “it is not clear 
that companies are changing their ways,” notes The Economist 
magazine.161 
Although ClinicalTrials.gov and other efforts to reduce 
publication bias are important steps in the right direction, they 
would not change the underlying standard for drug approval, even 
if successful.162 According to Congressional testimony, one reason 
to make trial results publicly accessible is to counter the “bias 
toward publication of positive results [and the suppression of 
                                                                                                     
Fraud Settlement, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2012, at A1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/03/business/glaxosmithkline-agrees-to-pay-3-
billion-in-fraud-settlement.html?_r=0. 
 157. Id. 
 158. See Danny Hakim & William K. Rashbaum, Spitzer Is Linked to 
Prostitution Ring, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/ 
03/10/nyregion/10cnd-spitzer.html?pagewanted=all&r_=0 (last visited Sept. 21, 
2013) (discussing the allegations against Mr. Spitzer, his press release, and the 
potential career repercussions) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 159. See Michael M. Grynbaum, Spitzer Resigns, Citing Personal Failings, 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2008), www.nytimes.com/2009/03/12/nyregion/12end-
resign.html?pagewanted=all (last visited Sept. 21, 2013) (“Governor Spitzer, 
whose rise to political power as a fierce enforcer of ethics in public life was 
undone by revelations of his own involvement with prostitutes, resigned on 
Wednesday . . . .”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 160. Infra note 161 and accompanying text. 
 161. Johnson & Johnson Out of the Mire?: The Justice Department May 
Spoil the Drugmaker’s Fresh Start, ECONOMIST, Apr. 28, 2012, at 75, available at 
http://www.economist.com/node/21553512. 
 162. See supra Part II.A (discussing the current legal standard for drug 
approval). 
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negative results that] may distort the community’s overall 
understanding of an intervention’s effectiveness or risk profile.”163 
Although the legislation increases the accessibility of clinical trial 
data and makes it more difficult to hide the results of unfavorable 
trials, it does not prevent companies from continuing to undertake 
trials until achieving two that are positive.164  
In addition, the advent of ClinicalTrials.gov is a change in 
degree, but not in kind. Clinical trial information submitted to 
government agencies such as the FDA has long been available to 
the public, to the extent it is not secret or otherwise exempted, 
under the Freedom of Information Act.165 This availability is 
reflected in the work of Kirsch and his colleagues noted above.166 
Moreover, even if ClinicalTrials.gov improves public access to trial 
information, it does not affect the standard for approval.167 For 
example, the evidence uncovered by Kirsch suggests that FDA 
officials were already aware of the multiple trials being conducted 
and the unimpressive (if occasionally statistically-significant) 
evidence of efficacy, but approved the drugs anyway in accordance 
with the existing legal standard.168 Figure 3 illustrates the role of 
ClinicalTrials.gov as a means to address the problem of selective 
publication, which can undermine the certainty that reported 
results are in fact accurate and representative of a given drugs 
characteristics.169 
                                                                                                     
 163. Publication and Disclosure Issues in Antidepressant Pediatric Clinical 
Trials: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. 
Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 108th Cong. 18 (2004) (statement of Dr. Janet 
Woodcock, Deputy Commissioner for Operations, Food and Drug 
Administration). 
 164. See supra Part IV.A (discussing FDA drug approval after two positive 
trials, despite other reported failed trials). 
 165. See Freedom of Information Act, Pub L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 383 (1966) 
(codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012)) (requiring disclosure of 
information submitted to the FDA, unless exempted under § 552(a)). 
 166. See Kirsch et al., Emperor’s, supra note 124, at 3 (noting that the study 
was conducted based on information reported to the FDA and obtained under 
the Freedom of Information Act). 
 167. See supra Part II.A (discussing the legal standard for FDA drug 
approval). 
 168. See Kirsch, Antidepressants, supra note 130 (discussing FDA approval 
of drugs with statistically significant, but clinically unimportant, positive 
results after two successful trials). 
 169. See Peterson, supra note 134, at 5 (“Because positive results are more 
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Figure 3: Efficacy Evaluation Problems and Existing Regulatory 
Solutions 
Nature of Problem Problem Regulatory Solution  
Certainty Selective publication ClinicalTrials.gov (also, private efforts) 
4. Publication Bias and Comparative Efficacy Claims 
The multiple-trial problem also manifests itself in the context 
of comparative efficacy claims. For example, of six clinical studies 
comparing the efficacy of Pepcid Complete (famotidine, magnesium 
hydroxide, and calcium carbonate) with calcium carbonate (the 
active ingredient in Tums), only two showed clear statistical 
significance, while another two “showed no statistically significant 
differences” and the final two “showed borderline significance.”170 
Although the FDA was aware of at least three equivocal studies 
that attempted but failed to show superiority of Pepcid Complete, 
which had formed the basis of an earlier NDA rejection,171 the two 
studies showing statistical significance provided the basis for FDA 
approval of Pepcid Complete as an over-the-counter product.172 
Similarly, of four clinical trials comparing single-enantiomer 
Nexium (esomeprazole) with racemic Prilosec (omeprazole), only 
two showed statistical significance.173 The two statistically 
significant trials showed only very modest differences in efficacy.174 
                                                                                                     
likely to be reported, the overall picture may appear rosier than justified by all 
available evidence.”). 
 170. SmithKline Beecham Consumer Healthcare, L.P. v. Johnson & 
Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharms. Co., No. 01 Civ. 2775(DAB), 2001 WL 
588846, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 1, 2001). 
 171. See Michael Elasoff, Statistical Review and Evaluation, in STATISTICAL 
REVIEW(S): APPLICATION NO. 20-958 13,13 (U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Ctr. For 
Drug Evaluation & Research 2000), http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_ 
docs/nda/2000/20-958_Pepcid%20Complete_statr_P1.pdf (noting the previous 
drug application denial based on similar clinical trials).  
 172. See SmithKline Beecham, 2001 WL 588846, at *3 (“These two studies 
were the so-called ‘pivotal’ studies that led the FDA to approve Pepcid Complete 
for [over-the-counter] use.”). 
 173. AstraZeneca, Drug Label for Nexium (esomeprazole magnesium), 10–11 
(2001), http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/label/2001/21153lbl.pdf.  
 174. Id. at 10. 
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One of them, for example, showed that Nexium had a 93.7% 
healing rate at the end of the eight-week study, less than ten 
percentage points higher than omeprazole’s 84.2% rate.175 This 
small difference becomes even less meaningful when one observes 
that the trial compared 40 mg of Nexium to 20 mg of 
omeprazole,176 reflecting the well-established technique of 
“proving” a new drug’s superiority by using a higher dose. 
Where drugs are approximately equivalent in efficacy to 
effective, previously-approved drugs, the concern is less that the 
new drug is not effective at all, and more that it may not be 
meaningfully more effective or that the claimed comparative 
effectiveness may mislead consumers into overpaying.177 In the 
case of Pepcid Complete and Tums, for example, the parties were 
arguing over whether the difference in effectiveness of the products 
was 7% or 11%178—hardly any difference at all—but the competing 
advertisements at issue in the case each portrayed the respective 
products as greatly superior to the other, as advertisements tend 
to do.179 Both parties agreed that the price difference between the 
products was 300%.180  
More important than price is the uncertainty over whether 
there is any difference in efficacy at all. Despite the rigorous 
elements of the gold standard that are intended to mitigate bias, 
ample evidence suggests that drug sponsors can and do influence 
trial outcomes.181 The identity of the trial sponsor has been 
repeatedly shown to correlate with the outcome of the study.182 
                                                                                                     
 175. Id. 
 176. Id.  
 177. See SmithKline Beecham Consumer Healthcare, L.P. v. Johnson & 
Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharms. Co., No. 01 Civ. 2775(DAB), 2001 WL 
588846, at *2, *4, *11 (S.D.N.Y. June 1, 2001) (discussing the commercial 
depiction of (the more expensive) Pepcid Complete as a faster, more effective 
alternative to Tums, despite studies showing limited differences in 
effectiveness). 
 178. Id. at *3. 
 179. Id. at *2. 
 180. Id. at *11. 
 181. Infra notes 182, 187 and accompanying text. 
 182. See Stephan Heres et al., Why Olanzapine Beats Risperidone, 
Risperidone Beats Quetiapine, and Quetiapine Beats Olanzapine: An Exploratory 
Analysis of Head-to-Head Comparison Studies of Second-Generation 
Antipsychotics, 163 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 185, 189 (2006) (finding that 90% of 
pharmaceutical sponsored trials yielded positive results). 
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One influential paper, for example, found that 90% of head-to-head 
comparative studies of antipsychotic drugs reported outcomes that 
favored the trial sponsor’s drug.183 It might be tempting to dismiss 
this finding as unsurprising, reasoning that drug companies are 
likely to invest in expensive head-to-head trials only where they 
have good reason to believe, in advance, that their drug in fact 
possesses superior efficacy.184 This cannot be the principal 
explanation, however, because the researchers found that 
“different comparisons of the same two antipsychotic drugs led to 
contradictory overall conclusions depending on the sponsor of the 
drug.”185  
Inconsistent results can arise from otherwise high-quality 
trials by making non-neutral comparisons, such as a trial that 
shows Lipitor (atorvastatin) “superior” to Pravachol 
(pravastatin)—by using 80mg of Lipitor but only 40mg of 
Pravachol.186 Through such techniques, relationships that are 
logically impossible can be “proven,” as reflected in the provocative, 
M.C. Escher-like title of one research paper: Why Olanzapine Beats 
Risperidone, Risperidone Beats Quetiapine, and Quetiapine Beats 
Olanzapine.187 Other studies have consistently confirmed similar 
sponsor bias in other therapeutic areas.188 
                                                                                                     
 183. Id. at 189. 
 184. See Warren Ross, Head to Head: Prizes, Pitfalls and Pains of 
Comparative Clinical Testing, MED. MKTG. & MEDIA, Aug. 2006, at 96 (noting 
that pharmaceutical companies sponsor head-to-head studies “to prove their 
drug is superior”). 
 185. Heres et. al., supra note 182, at 189. 
 186. Ross, supra note 184, at 92, 98. 
 187. See Heres et al., supra note 182, at 189 (“On the basis of these 
contrasting findings in head-to-head trials, it appears that whatever company 
sponsors the trial produces the better antipsychotic drug.”). 
 188. See, e.g., Paula A. Rochon et al., A Study of Manufacturer Supported 
Trials of Nonsteroidal Anti-Inflammatory Drugs in the Treatment of Arthritis, 
154 ARCH. INTERNAL MED. 157, 161 (1994) (“Our results indicate that the 
manufacturer-associated drug is always reported as being either superior to or 
comparable with the comparison drug.”); Justin E. Bekelman et al., Scope and 
Impact of Financial Conflicts of Interest in Biomedical Research: A Systematic 
Review, 289 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 454, 456, 458 tbl.2 (2003) (aggregating in table 
format eleven previous studies of sponsorship bias, all of which “concluded that 
industry sponsored research tends to yield pro-industry conclusions”).  
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5. Government-Run Clinical Trials 
If industry-sponsored clinical trials are problematic because 
they are biased, an obvious solution is to instead engage some 
unbiased third party such as the government to conduct the 
trials.189 Alternately, the government might contract out the task 
to a trusted intermediary such as a medical school, which would 
report to the government rather than to the drug sponsor.190 A 
number of prominent academics have made similar suggestions in 
the past,191 and indeed government-run trials might well go a long 
way toward addressing issues of bias, which include not only 
publication bias but various types of fraud, misleading 
presentation, and poor quality.192 Acting as a representative of 
public rather than private interests, the government might be 
better positioned to stop development of new drugs when 
anticipated efficacy levels fail to materialize rather than 
continuing to pour money into additional or larger trials in an 
effort to show the minimal levels of efficacy needed for approval. 
Nevertheless, solving a market failure by legislatively 
abolishing the market represents an extreme step. Not only would 
such a change be politically challenging and potentially disruptive, 
but it might also lead to unforeseen consequences. For example, 
placing the obligation to run clinical trials on the government may 
cause drug companies to merely shift the focus of their attempted 
influence from the private entities that currently conduct clinical 
trials to government entities, making such influence even less 
transparent than it currently is and further promoting the 
                                                                                                     
 189. See Heres et al., supra note 182, at 190 (suggesting that the FDA 
evaluate the methodology of studies). 
 190. See, e.g., Marc A. Rodwin, Independent Clinical Trials to Test Drugs: 
The Neglected Reform, 6 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 113, 117 (2012) 
(“Researchers would not depend on drug firms to select them and so would lack 
incentive to favor the drug firm.”). 
 191. See, e.g., id. at 113 (exploring the advantages and disadvantages of 
various reform measures). Rodwin also notes the earlier proposals of Drs. 
Marcia Angell, Jerry Avorn, and others. Id. at 126–27. 
 192. See, e.g., Michael Hochman & Danny McCormick, Endpoint Selection 
and Relative (Versus Absolute) Risk Reporting in Published Medication Trials, 
26 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 1246, 1247 tbl.1 (2011) (noting that means to make 
outcomes appear better than they are include the use of (1) relative rather than 
absolute measures; (2) surrogate endpoints; (3) composite endpoints; and 
(4) disease-specific endpoints).  
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institutional corruption of government. Said differently, the 
desirability of government-run clinical trials rests on the 
assumption that the government would be better insulated than 
private parties from the influence of drug sponsors, an assumption 
that deserves critical examination.  
Fortunately, a softer and politically more feasible approach 
may be able to facilitate market functioning. One such approach, 
for example, is to increase the transparency of efficacy information. 
Markets tend to work better when market participants have access 
to good information,193 and it may be a relatively simple matter to 
cast light on the magnitude of a drug’s efficacy so that patients, 
doctors, and others could evaluate for themselves the drug’s value. 
Helping the public become aware of the magnitude of drug efficacy 
might be accomplished, for example, by promulgating guidelines 
for measuring and describing efficacy, and by making simple and 
clear statements of efficacy easily available, such as by placing 
them on product labeling or by making them available on a user-
friendly and freely accessible website. 
The FDA already regulates trial quality and bias through 
its extensive regulations.194 Therefore, even if a manufacturer can 
make its product appear slightly better than placebo (or slightly 
better than a comparator product), it is unlikely in a regulated 
environment that publication bias can make a completely 
ineffective drug appear extremely effective, or vice versa. It is more 
likely that bias will only nudge the trial outcome slightly in favor 
of the party in interest, as appears to be happening with many 
pharmaceutical trials. The ability to nudge trial outcomes would 
explain why comparative studies tend to favor the trial sponsor,195 
and also why so many new drugs show benefits over placebos that 
are of only the most modest relevance (if there is any benefit at 
                                                                                                     
 193. See ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF MODERN ECONOMIC HISTORY 73 (Robert 
M. Whaples & Randall E. Parker eds., 2013) (“Neoclassical economic models 
often assume costless information and perfect markets.”); James A. Ohlson, The 
Social Value of Public Information in Production Economies, in ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS OF INFORMATION AND CONTRACTS 95, 107 (John E. Butterworth et al. 
eds. 1988) (“Any movement away from perfect information . . . leads to . . . a 
welfare loss . . . .”). 
 194. 21 C.F.R. § 314.126 (2013).   
 195. Supra notes 127–31 and accompanying text.  
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all).196  
Casting light on the magnitude of efficacy can appropriately 
shift the focus of the prescription/consumption decision to the 
amount of benefit a drug confers rather than the binary question of 
whether the drug is FDA-approved, mitigating the effects of bias. 
If simple, minimally intrusive efforts to facilitate more rational 
consumption decisions prove inadequate, government-run trials 
could then be considered as a last resort.  
B. A “Significant Difference” Is Not Always a Significant Difference 
To be clear on the conceptual framework, the “substantial 
evidence” standard of 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) has been construed in the 
accompanying FDA regulations197 to incorporate generally, but 
flexibly, the elements of randomization, blinding, and placebo 
control.198 These elements are widely accepted as defining the gold 
standard of clinical research.199 The gold standard, in turn, 
incorporates a requirement that research results be statistically 
significant.200 
                                                                                                     
 196. See, e.g., Alex Berenson, Cancer Drugs Offer Hope, But at a Huge 
Expense, N.Y. TIMES (July, 12, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/12/ 
business/12cancer.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (last visited on Sept. 17, 2013) 
(“[T]he new cancer drugs help most patients only marginally, prolonging life by 
a few weeks or months.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); P. 
Bentham et. al., Long-Term Donepezil Treatment in 565 Patients with 
Alzheimer’s Disease (AD2000): Randomized Double-Blind Trial, 363 LANCET 
2105, 2105 (2004) (“Donepezil is not cost effective, with benefits below 
minimally relevant thresholds.”).  
 197. 21 C.F.R. § 314.126 (2013). 
 198. See In re Avandia Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liability, No. 2007–
MD–1871, 2011 WL 13576, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 4, 2011) (“Double-blind 
randomized control trials, and particularly monotherapy trials comparing 
Avandia use to a placebo, are the ‘gold standard’ of epidemiology.”). 
 199. Id. 
 200. See id. at *4 (“[U]nder a scientific standard one must have statistically 
significant findings to justify a causal inference.”); Tucker v. SmithKline 
Beecham Corp., 701 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1062 (S.D. Ind. 2010) (stating that the 
gold standard utilizes the concept of statistical significance); see also Capizzano 
v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Health and Hum. Servs., Nos. 00–759V, 01–221V, 99–
609V, 99–591V, 99–628V, 2003 WL 21432586, at *3 (Fed. Cl. June 20, 2003) 
(“Respondent's expert Dr. Moulton testified that the gold standard for proof of 
causation would be a double-blind controlled study with a statistically 
significant sample.”); Jonathan Denne & Gregory Enas, “Substantial Evidence” 
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1. Statistical Significance Is a Measure of Certainty, Not Efficacy 
The FDA regulations note that an adequate and well-
controlled study should “us[e] a design that permits a valid 
comparison with a control to provide a quantitative assessment of 
drug effect.”201 Although the term “quantitative assessment” might 
suggest a quantification of the level of efficacy itself, the context (“a 
valid comparison with a control”) makes clear that what is 
quantified is not the drug’s level of efficacy per se, but rather the 
relationship between the results from the control group and those 
from the active group. This relationship is embodied in the concept 
of “statistical significance.”202  
Statistical significance is a measure of the probability that an 
outcome occurred as a result of a particular chosen variable, rather 
than as a result of chance.203 To illustrate, suppose researchers 
administered a double-blind study in which they randomly divided 
1,000 patients with a history of heart attack into two groups. 
Suppose further that all members of one group received placebo 
(the “placebo group”), while all members of the other group 
received the drug under investigation (the “active group”). Finally, 
suppose that at the end of ten years, all of those in the placebo 
group suffered at least one additional heart attack, while none of 
those in the active group suffered another heart attack. Examining 
these results, the researchers could reasonably conclude that the 
extremely favorable outcome was related to the presence or 
absence of the drug, and was not the result of random chance.  
In practice, results are rarely so clear-cut. Continuing the 
previous example, suppose that at the end of ten years 55% of 
                                                                                                     
from a Replicated Secondary Analysis, Followed by a Single Prospective 
Confirmatory Study, 42 DRUG INFO. J. 131, 131 (2008) (“[T]he standard 
paradigm for providing substantial evidence is usually two well-controlled 
confirmatory studies in which a statistically significant difference has been 
shown . . . .”). 
 201. 21 C.F.R. § 314.126(b)(2) (2013) (emphasis added). 
 202. For background information on statistical significance and hypothesis 
testing, see DAVID RAY ANDERSON ET AL., STATISTICS FOR BUSINESS & ECONOMICS 
338–92 (2008).  
 203. See Ficken v. Clinton, 841 F. Supp. 2d 85, 91 (D.D.C. 2012) (“Statistical 
significance is a measure of the probability that the outcome of a statistical 
analysis would have occurred by chance. . . .” (citing Segar v. Smith 738 F.2d 
1249, 1268 (D.D.C. 1984))). 
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those in the “control group” experienced heart attacks, while only 
51% of those in the “active group” did so. Under these 
circumstances, it is more difficult to determine whether the 
difference of 4% is the result of the drug or merely of random 
chance. Fortunately, statistical methods can be used to quantify 
the likelihood that the difference is the result of mere chance. 
These methods result in the calculation of “p-values,” which 
represent the probability that the outcome was the result of 
chance.204 For example, a p-value of 0.10 would indicate a 10% 
probability that the observed difference was the result of mere 
chance, and a 90% probability that the difference was due to the 
variable under study, such as a new drug. Smaller p-values are 
therefore desirable when testing for drug efficacy, since the 
smaller the p-value, the greater the probability that the observed 
improvement was due to the drug under study.  
Statistical significance is therefore a concept that measures 
the certainty of an outcome rather than its magnitude. It is not a 
measurement of efficacy level. In addition, the cutoff for statistical 
significance is essentially arbitrary:205 By convention, a p-value 
calculated to be 5% or less (p=0.05) is considered to be “statistically 
significant,”206 but other p-values could also be used. Nevertheless, 
p=0.05 is the standard generally used by the FDA (and generally 
accepted by the scientific community) when evaluating the efficacy 
attested to by clinical trial data in order to be reasonably certain 
that a Type I error is unlikely to have occurred.207 Figure 4 
highlights the function of statistical significance as a measure of 
                                                                                                     
 204. See Henry I. Miller & David R. Henderson, The FDA’s Risky Risk-
Aversion, 145 POL’Y REV. 3, 14 (2007), available at http://hoover.org/ 
publications/policy-review/article/6147 (discussing what constitutes a p-value). 
 205. See id. at 14 (stating that, while normally established at p=.05, 
statistical significance is arbitrary). 
 206. Vanderwerf v. SmithKlineBeecham Corp., 529 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1301 
n.9 (D. Kan. 2008) (citing Coates v. Johnson & Johnson, 756 F.2d 524, 537 n.13 
(7th Cir. 1985); Federal Judicial Center, Reference Manual on Scientific 
Evidence 124, 357–58 (2d ed. 2000)). 
 207. See Joseph W. Cromier, Advancing FDA’s Regulatory Science Through 
Weight of Evidence Evaluations, 28 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1, 9 (2011) 
(“FDA generally considers a clinical trial to be a success if the p value is less 
than or equal to 0.05 when comparing the treatment group to the control 
group.”); Russell Katz, FDA: Evidentiary Standards for Drug Development and 
Approval, 1 NEURORX 307, 311 (2004) (“[T]he typical ‘cap’ on the type I error 
rate is set at 5% . . . .”). 
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certainty that study results are real rather than the result of 
random chance.  
Figure 4: Addressing Random Variation: Statistical Significance 
Problem Regulatory Solution  
Type I error 
(i.e., the appearance of efficacy is 
actually due to random variation) 
 
Statistical Significance 
2. When Is a “Significantly Effective” Drug Not Significantly 
Effective? 
The greatest—or, one might say, most significant—problem 
with the standard of statistical significance is the double meaning 
that can be ascribed to it. In the context of statistics, saying that a 
drug is “significantly” more effective than placebo would be 
understood to mean that the difference in efficacy is statistically 
significant.208 For example, a book entitled A Guide to Treatments 
that Work notes that “clomipramine was . . . significantly more 
effective than citalopram,”209 that “risperidone was significantly 
more effective than placebo”210 and that “[a]ll SSRI’s have been 
reported to be significantly more effective than a placebo.”211 To 
the statistician, this means only that the difference in efficacy, 
regardless of how small, was not due to random chance. To the 
layperson, however, a “significantly” more effective drug may be 
understood to mean one that is much more effective. Statistical 
texts have warned of this double meaning since at least the 1950s:  
It is essential not to confuse the statistical usage of 
“significance” with the everyday usage. In everyday usage, 
“significant” means “of practical importance,” or simply 
                                                                                                     
 208. See PETER E. NATHAN & JACK M GORMAN, A GUIDE TO TREATMENTS THAT 
WORK 279 (2007) (discussing statistical studies that show that in the context of 
statistics “significantly more effective” means statistical significance); JOHN 
O’GRADY ET AL., MEDICINES, MEDICAL DEVICES AND THE LAW 189 (2011) (“If the 
probability of the difference occurring by chance is 1 in 20, or less, then the 
result is said to be ‘significant.’”). 
 209. NATHAN & GORMAN, supra note 208, at 275. 
 210. Id. at 210. 
 211. Id. at 279. 
PHARMACEUTICAL EFFICACY 2115 
“important.” In statistical usage, “significant” means “signifying 
a characteristic of the population from which the sample is 
drawn,” regardless of whether the characteristic is important.212 
This double entendre can be skillfully employed to a drug 
company’s advantage. For example, Pfizer boasts on one consumer-
oriented website that “[i]n clinical studies, for patients with RA 
[rheumatoid arthritis], CELEBREX demonstrated significant 
reduction in joint tenderness/pain and joint swelling.”213 Similarly, 
Amgen proudly states in the headline to an online press release 
that Enbrel (etanercept) “[s]ignificantly [r]educed [l]evels of C-
[r]eactive [p]rotein.”214 Notwithstanding that it is probably not at 
all clear to the lay reader why it is beneficial for a patient to 
achieve lower levels of C-reactive protein, these promotional 
materials seem intended to convey the message that the drugs are 
not only beneficial, but beneficial enough to justify a trip to the 
doctor for a prescription and perhaps also an out-of-pocket co-
payment. That the drugs offer “significant” benefits may be true in 
the statistical sense, but lay readers not trained in statistics may 
perceive the message quite differently. 
Even if a claim of significance is true according to one of its 
meanings, courts have the power to deem that claim to be in 
violation of the Lanham Act215 “by necessary implication if it is 
                                                                                                     
 212. STEPHEN THOMAS ZILIAK & DIERDRE N. MCCLOSKEY, THE CULT OF 
STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE 110 (2008) (quoting W. ALLEN WALLIS & HARRY 
ROBERTS, STATISTICS: A NEW APPROACH 385 (1956)); see also Michael D. Maltz, 
Deviating from the Mean: The Declining Significance of Significance, 31 J. RES. 
CRIME & DELINQUENCY 434, 440 (1994) (“Statistical significance does not imply 
substantive significance, and most researchers know this—but this does not 
stop them from implying that it does.”). 
 213. About Celebrex, PFIZER (2013), http://www.celebrex.com/about-
celecrex.aspx (last visited Sept. 17, 2013) (emphasis added) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Symbicort “Fishing” Commercial 
(2012), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oG9MxLwnapE (last visited Sept. 17, 
2013) (“[Symbicort] significantly improved my lung function starting within five 
minutes.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 214. Sonia Fiorenza et al., New Findings Show Enbrel(R) (etanercept) 
Significantly Reduced Levels of C-Reactive Protein, a Marker of Inflammation, 
in Patients with Moderate to Severe Plaque Psoriasis, AMGEN (Feb. 1, 2008), 
http://www.amgen.com/media/media_pr_detail.jsp?releaseID=1103148 (last 
visited Oct. 22, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 215. See Pub. L. No.79-489, § 43, 60 Stat. 427 (1946) (codified as amended at 
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2013) (discussing civil actions for false designations of 
origin, false descriptions, and dilution). 
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susceptible to more than one interpretation” and the other 
interpretation is false.216 In addition, the FDA has general 
authority to censure companies that disseminate advertisements 
that are misleading, including those that “[u]s[e] the concept of 
‘statistical significance’ to support a claim that has not been 
demonstrated to have clinical significance or validity.”217 
However, neither of these avenues of redress has been 
particularly powerful in policing the misuse of the concept of 
statistical significance. The Lanham Act, the principal federal 
trademark statute, is generally invoked by competitors seeking to 
use the necessary implication doctrine to enjoin another 
competitor’s advertisements, as in the Pepcid Complete case 
described above.218 Comparative advertisements, however, seem to 
be more pronounced in the over-the-counter (OTC) market, 
perhaps because advertised prescription drugs rely primarily on 
patent status to ward off competitors, while OTC products focus 
more on branding.219 Whatever the reason, there are few reported 
opinions that invoke the Lanham Act to combat the misuse of 
claims of statistically significant efficacy differences in the 
prescription drugs sector.  
FDA efforts are also unlikely to be adequate. Due to funding 
constraints, the FDA like all enforcement agencies must prioritize 
its efforts.220 As a result, low priority may be assigned to 
                                                                                                     
 216. SmithKline Beecham Consumer Healthcare, L.P. v. Johnson & 
Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharms. Co., 906 F. Supp. 178, 184 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) 
(citing Cuisinarts, Inc. v. Robot-Coupe Int’l Corp., No. 81 Civ. 731-CSH, 1982 
WL 121559, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 9, 1982)). 
 217. 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(7) (2013); see also id. § 202.1(e)(6)(vii) (stating that 
an advertisement is false or misleading if it “[c]ontains favorable data or 
conclusions from nonclinical studies of a drug, such as in laboratory animals or 
in vitro, in a way that suggests they have clinical significance when in fact no 
such clinical significance has been demonstrated”); 21 U.S.C. § 353b (2012) 
(“Prereview of Television Advertisements”); cf. 21 C.F.R. § 201.200 (2013) 
(“Disclosure of drug efficacy study evaluations [DESI] in labeling and 
advertising.”).  
 218. See SmithKline Beecham, 906 F. Supp. at 184 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (applying 
the necessary implication doctrine). 
 219. See Simon P. Andersen & Regis Renault, Comparative Advertising: 
Disclosing Horizontal Match Information, 40 RAND J. OF ECON. 558, 577 (2009) 
(discussing why over-the-counter drugs such as Tylenol engage in comparative 
advertising to fend off competition). 
 220. See Bryan A. Liang, Fade to Black: Importation and Counterfeit Drugs, 
32 AM. J.L. & MED. 279, 300 (2006) (“[T]he FDA is chronically underfunded, 
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enforcement activities directed against claims of “significance” 
that, while literally true according to one meaning of the term, are 
less so under another. Bringing the FDA’s modest enforcement 
resources to bear against the massive advertising campaigns of 
powerful industries can be, as the FDA itself has complained, “like 
bringing a butter knife to a gun fight.”221 Given the volume of 
advertisements disseminated during prime-time television alone, 
thirty-one warning letters in a single year may indicate the extent 
of the problem rather than stand as an assurance that all 
misleading claims are dealt with swiftly.222 
If prescription drug advertisements are misleading and 
current avenues of redress are inadequate, one possible solution 
is to legislatively ban such advertisements altogether. While 
this may seem an extreme step, almost every country to consider 
the issue has concluded that prohibiting or severely restricting 
direct-to-consumer prescription drug advertisements is 
appropriate. Only the United States and New Zealand (which 
has a population less than that of greater Atlanta)223 have 
concluded otherwise,224 and in the United States the decision to 
liberalize advertising came only in 1997.225 In response, 
                                                                                                     
leading to situations in which scarce resources must be stretched and policies 
prioritized for enforcement. . . .”).  
 221. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Food & Drug Admin., 696 F.3d 1205, 1221 
(D.C. Cir. 2012).  
 222. See Jacqueline West, National Marketing Gone Unintentionally Global: 
Direct-To-Consumer Advertising of Pharmaceutical Products and the Internet, 
10 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 405, 414 (2012), http://law.hofstra.edu/pdf/academics/ 
journals/jibl/jibl_volxii_national_marketing_gone_unintentionally_global_west.p
df (stating that thirty-one warning letters were sent in 2011 by the Office of 
Prescription Drug Promotion). 
 223. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 
2012 (2012), http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s0020.pdf 
(indicating an Atlanta area population of 5,269,000); Population Clock,  
STATISTICS NEW ZEALAND, http://www.stats.govt.nz/tools_and_services/ 
population_clock.aspx (last visited Sept. 17, 2013) (indicating an estimated New 
Zealand resident population of 4,458,047) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review).  
 224. See Marjorie Delbaere, Metaphors and Myths in Pharmaceutical 
Advertising, 82 SOC. SCI. & MED. 21, 21 (2013) (stating that, of the countries that 
have addressed the issue, only the United States and New Zealand permit direct 
to consumer advertisements for pharmaceuticals).  
 225. See Draft Guidance for Industry: Consumer-Directed Broadcast 
Advertisements, 62 Fed. Reg. 43,171–72 (Aug. 12, 1997) (discussing the FDA’s 
requirements for consumer-directed broadcasting); Lars Noah, Advertising 
2118 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2073 (2013) 
state226 and federal227 bills have emerged to limit such 
advertising, and academics have argued the merits of ad 
prohibition.228  
Given the serious public health issues at stake combined with 
the fact that very few advertised drugs offer significant therapeutic 
advantages over other drugs that may be much cheaper but 
unadvertised,229 a prohibition on drug advertising might well be 
preferable to the status quo. The suppression of misleadingly 
optimistic presentations of minimally advantageous new drugs 
might among other things prevent the crowding out of more 
balanced, healthy and realistic views of drug efficacy.230 It would 
                                                                                                     
Prescription Drugs to Consumers: Assessing the Regulatory and Liability Issues, 
32 GA. L. REV. 141, 141 (1997) (noting the dramatic marketing shift toward 
direct-to-consumer prescription drug advertising during the fifteen years prior 
to 1997). 
 226. See, e.g., H.B. 2061, 188th Gen. Ct. (Mass. 2013) (“An Act Prohibiting 
Advertising by Pharmaceutical Companies”); H.B. 2646, 188th Gen. Ct. (Mass. 
2013) (“An Act to Eliminate the Tax Deduction for Direct to Consumer 
Pharmaceutical Marketing”); H.C.R. 66, 2003 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2003), 
available at http://www.lrc.state.ky.us/record/ 03rs/HC66/bill.doc (proposing a 
resolution “to limit, ban, or otherwise impose strict standards on direct-to-
consumer advertising of drugs by pharmaceutical companies”). 
 227. See, e.g., H.R. 722, 112th Cong. (2011) (proposing the “Say No to Drug 
Ads Act,” which would “deny any [tax] deduction for direct-to-consumer 
advertisements of prescription drugs”); H.R. 2966, 111th Cong. (2009) (“Say No 
to Drug Ads Act”); H.R. 5105, 107th Cong. (2002) (“Say No to Drug Ads Act”).  
 228. See Kurt C. Stange, Time to Ban Direct to Consumer Prescription Drug 
Marketing, 5 ANNALS FAM. MED. 101, 102 (2007) (arguing that direct-to-
consumer advertisements should be banned for prescription drugs); Joel Lexchin 
& Barbara Mintzes, Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of Prescription Drugs: The 
Evidence Says No, 21(2) J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 194, 196–97 (2002) 
(providing evidence that direct-to-consumer advertising should not be used for 
prescription drugs). 
 229. See Lexchin & Mintzes, supra note 228, at 194 (“There is no evidence 
that direct-to-consumer advertising results in any improvement in health 
outcomes.”).  
 230. See George Loewenstein, Out of Control: Visceral Influences on 
Behaviour, 65 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 272, 272 (1996) 
(“[V]isceral factors have a disproportionate effect on behavior and tend to ‘crowd 
out’ virtually all goals . . . .”); cf. Catherine MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil 
Rights, and Speech, 20 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 18 (1985) (asserting that 
pornography “is not imagery in some relation to a reality . . . [but] is a sexual 
reality”). Analogously, television advertisements can create a false imagery of 
drug efficacy that becomes a perceived reality, leading patients to demand 
nearly worthless drugs no matter the cost or potential side effects. 
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also help to rein in wasteful expenditures that needlessly inflate 
healthcare costs.  
Nevertheless, preventing businesses from communicating with 
their customers is a drastic step. From the business perspective, it 
can raise First Amendment concerns,231 while from the consumer’s 
perspective, it can block off a potential channel of useful 
information232 (even if little useful information is currently flowing 
through that channel). Most importantly, a less restrictive means 
of reforming direct-to-consumer advertising is available, namely, 
increasing the utility of the information in advertisements by 
requiring a clear presentation of efficacy data.233 Such a tempered 
approach would preserve channels of communication, increase 
transparency, leave the decision in the hands of consumers (and 
their doctors), and embody free market ideals that have been the 
traditional underpinning of the United States economic system.234 
Should the reform prove insufficient within a reasonable period of 
time, prohibition could always be instituted as a last resort. 
                                                                                                     
 231. See Mark I. Schwartz, To Ban or Not to Ban—That Is the Question: The 
Constitutionality of a Moratorium on Consumer Drug Advertising, 63 FOOD & 
DRUG L.J. 1, 3 n.5 (2008) (noting that legislation proposed in 2007 that would 
have allowed the FDA to impose a moratorium on advertising was abandoned 
following claims that it would violate the First Amendment); see also Thompson 
v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 374 (2002) (“We have previously rejected 
the notion that the Government has an interest in preventing the dissemination 
of truthful commercial information in order to prevent members of the public 
from making bad decisions with the information.”); Gerald Masoudi & 
Christopher Pruitt, The Food and Drug Administration v. The First 
Amendment: A Survey of Recent FDA Enforcement, 21 HEALTH MATRIX 111, 112 
(2011) (noting that the FDA’s “curtailment of constitutionally protected 
commercial speech” can “remov[e] truthful (and useful) product communications 
from the marketplace”).  
 232. See generally Anthony D. Cox & Dena Cox, A Defense of Direct-to-
Consumer Prescription Drug Advertising, 53 BUS. HORIZONS 221 (2010) 
(acknowledging problems, but concluding that advertising can increase 
consumer knowledge and awareness). Cox and Cox also argue that direct-to-
consumer advertising, despite its problems, is at least better than physician 
targeted promotion, which should be a greater source of public concern. Id. at 
227. 
 233. Other proposals that fall short of a full ban have also been suggested. 
See, e.g., Margaret Gilhooley, Commercial Speech, Drugs, Promotion and a 
Tailored Advertisement Moratorium, 21 HEALTH MATRIX 97, 98–99 (2011) 
(discussing a prohibition on advertisements for only recently approved drugs, or 
alternately, for only the most high-risk recently approved drugs).  
 234. See City of Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 416 (1978) 
(acknowledging “the Nation’s free-market goals”).  
2120 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2073 (2013) 
3. Statistical Significance Is a De Minimis Requirement that Can 
Be Met by Diet, Exercise, and Other Mundane, Inexpensive 
Treatments 
The low bar imposed by the statistical significance 
requirement might well allow for a number of mundane, 
inexpensive treatments to receive FDA approval, so long as they 
could qualify under the statutory definitions of a “drug” (or 
“device”).235 For example, clinical trials have demonstrated that 
the drug Aricept (donepezil) is statistically significantly more 
effective than a placebo in treating Alzheimer’s disease, and as a 
result the drug was approved by the FDA.236 But fruit juice, 
exercise, music, and even coffee might also be able to meet the 
lax significance standard. One study, for example, followed 
almost 2,000 people for seven years and concluded that fruit and 
vegetable juices were “highly significant” in delaying the onset 
of Alzheimer’s,237 suggesting what may be in any event a 
sensible dietary change to improve health. A meta-analysis of 
multiple studies concluded that exercise has a “robust and 
beneficial influence on the cognition of sedentary older 
adults,”238 while another meta-analysis concluded that music 
therapy was an effective treatment for Alzheimer’s.239 Research 
                                                                                                     
 235. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 321(g)(1), (h), (p) (2012) (defining the terms “drug,” 
“new drug,” and “device”).  
 236. See S.L. Rogers et al., A 24-Week, Double-Blind, Placebo-Controlled 
Trial of Donepezil in Patients with Alzheimer’s Disease, 50 NEUROLOGY 137, 137 
(1998), http://www.stvincents.ie/dynamic/File/Donepezil%20study.pdf (describing 
how donepezil is more effective than a placebo in treating Alzheimer’s disease). 
 237. See Qi Dai et al., Fruit and Vegetable Juice and Alzheimer’s Disease: 
The Kame Project, 199 AM. J. MED. 751, 751 (2006) (discussing how fruit and 
vegetable juices play an important role in delaying the onset of Alzheimer’s 
disease, particularly among those who are at high risk for the disease).  
 238. Stanley Colcombe & Arthur F. Kramer, Fitness Effects on the Cognitive 
Function of Older Adults: a Meta-Analytic Study, 14 PSYCH. SCI. 125, 128 (2003); 
see also Patricia Heyn et al., The Effects of Exercise Training on Elderly Persons 
with Cognitive Impairment and Dementia: A Meta-Analysis, 85 ARCHIVES 
PHYSICAL MED. & REHABIL. 1694, 1694 (2006) (“Exercise training increases 
fitness, physical function, cognitive function, and positive behavior in people 
with dementia and related cognitive impairments.”). 
 239. See Susan M. Kroger et al., Is Music Therapy an Effective Intervention 
for Dementia? A Meta-Analytic Review of the Literature, 36 J. MUSIC THERAPY 2, 
2 (1999) (finding the effect of music therapy to be “highly significant” for 
individuals with dementias).  
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has also shown that caffeine is effective in treating Alzheimer’s 
Disease.240  
Although diet, exercise, music, or caffeine may not necessarily 
be substantially effective in treating Alzheimer’s, the likelihood 
that these ordinary, inexpensive and easily available treatments 
could meet the statistical significance standard casts light on just 
how de minimis that standard is. It is perhaps no surprise that 
studies confirm the efficacy of diet and exercise in improving 
cognition.241 Nor is it surprising that caffeine, a stimulant, 
stimulates brain activity in some manner, or that music, which is 
self-evidently associated with emotion, can favorably affect the 
brain.242 These studies merely corroborate the conventional 
wisdom and lend a measure of scientific credibility to what the 
public thought it already knew. Few people, however, place their 
hopes for relief from Alzheimer’s in walking, listening to music, 
drinking coffee, or eating vegetables, and fewer still would be 
willing to pay $100 for a glass of vegetable juice or a 10-minute 
walk. Yet desperate patients will pay this much and more for an 
FDA-approved pill that may do as little, or less, than any of these 
ordinary treatments.  
The vulnerability of the statistical significance standard, 
therefore, is that it utterly fails to differentiate between factors 
that have a statistically significant effect in treating diseases or 
conditions, and those that are substantially effective in treating 
them. To offer yet another example, one randomized controlled 
trial concluded that “light therapy and fluoxetine [Prozac] are 
comparably effective treatments for patients with [seasonal 
affective disorder],” a type of depression.243 If this approximate 
                                                                                                     
 240. Gary W. Arendash & Chuanhai Cao, Caffeine and Coffee as Therapeutic 
Agents Against Alzheimer’s Disease, 20 J. ALZHEIMER’S DISEASE S117 (2010).  
 241. See Qi Dai et al., supra note 237, at 751 (finding fruits and vegetables 
to delay Alzheimer’s); Colcombe & Kramer, supra note 238, at 128 (finding 
exercise to improve cognitive function of elderly adults). 
 242. See Kroger et al., supra note 239, at 2 (finding caffeine to be an effective 
treatment against Alzheimer’s).  
 243. Raymond W. Lam et al., The Can-SAD Study: A Randomized 
Controlled Trial of the Effectiveness of Light Therapy and Fluoxetine in Patients 
with Winter Seasonal Affective Disorder, 163 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 805, 811 (2006).  
The Drug Effectiveness Review Project cited this study with approval. GERALD 
GARTLEHNER ET AL., DRUG CLASS REVIEW: SECOND-GENERATION 
ANTIDEPRESSANTS: FINAL UPDATE 5 REPORT 47 (2011), http://www. 
healthandwelfare.idaho.gov/Portals/0/Medical/MedicaidCHIP/AntidepressantsFin
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equivalence were understood either by the medical community or 
the marketplace, it would be difficult to explain the $21 billion 
spent on Prozac during its first thirteen years on the market.244 
One could instead simply buy very bright lights, move one’s 
workspace closer to a window, step outside during daylight hours, 
etc. 
V. “Clinical Significance” Does Not Imply Greater Efficacy 
Proponents of the current efficacy standard sometimes argue 
that drugs cannot be approved unless the level of efficacy is 
“clinically significant,” apparently suggesting that “clinical 
significance” requires an elevated degree of efficacy.245 There is no 
statutory or regulatory basis for such a distinction, nor can such a 
distinction be found in FDA guidance documents or court 
decisions. If clinical significance has any meaning distinct from 
statistical significance, it is that clinical significance means 
statistical significance in humans (as opposed to in animals or in 
vitro).  
A. The Law Requires Clinical Significance 
FDA regulations do include a clinical significance requirement 
in a number of provisions.246 For example, “effectiveness” in the 
context of over-the-counter products is defined as “a reasonable 
expectation that, in a significant proportion of the target 
population, the pharmacological effect of the drug, when used 
under adequate directions for use and warnings against unsafe 
                                                                                                     
alReport.pdf. 
 244. Bethany McLean, A Bitter Pill, FORTUNE, Aug. 13, 2001, at 118.  
 245. See, e.g., DAVID MACHIN, YIN BUN CHEUNG & MAHESH K.B. PARMAR, 
SURVIVAL ANALYSIS: A PRACTICAL APPROACH 1, 17 (2d. 1995), available at 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/doi/10.1002/047003457 
2.ch1/pdf (arguing that clinical significance, as opposed to statistical 
significance, implies a difference in efficacy between two treatments that is 
“substantial”); MICHAL J. CAMPBELL, DAVID MACHIN & STEPHEN J. WALTERS, 
MEDICAL STATISTICS: A TEXTBOOK FOR THE HEALTH SCIENCES 1, 288 (4d. 2010), 
http://tinyurl.com/lal6sb3 (arguing that results can be statistically but not 
clinically significant). 
 246. Infra notes 247–49 and accompanying text. 
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use, will provide clinically significant relief of the type claimed.”247 
Parallel provisions require that biologics “serve a clinically 
significant function in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, 
or prevention of disease in man,”248 and that medical devices 
“provide clinically significant results.”249 With respect to the 
efficacy needed for new prescription drug approval, the term 
“clinically significant” appears nowhere in the statute250 or 
regulations,251 but the statute does require the undertaking of 
“clinical trials” that “form the primary basis of an effectiveness 
claim.”252 Thus, the clinical significance requirement is 
incorporated into the new drug statute as well as applying in other 
areas of FDA regulation. 
B. Clinical Significance Means Statistical Significance in Humans 
Although the law requires clinical significance in a variety of 
contexts,253 nowhere in the regulations or statute is it stated that a 
showing of clinical significance for new drugs necessitates an 
elevated degree of efficacy vis-à-vis statistical significance. Instead 
the most plausible reading of the law is that clinical significance 
                                                                                                     
 247. 21 C.F.R. § 330.10(a)(4)(ii) (2013) (emphasis added). 
 248. Id. § 601.25(d)(2) (emphasis added). 
 249. Id. § 860.7(e)(1) (emphasis added).  
 250. See 21 U.S.C. § 355 (d)(7) (2012) (defining substantial evidence to 
include “evidence consisting of adequate and well-controlled investigations, 
including clinical investigations”).  
 251. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 201.57(a)(7) (2013) (noting that “clinically 
significant clinical pharmacologic information” must appear in the “[h]ighlights 
of prescribing information” section of drug labeling); id. § 201.57(c)(3)(i)(J) 
(requiring drug labeling to indicate “[e]fficacious . . . concentration ranges . . . if 
established and clinically significant”); see also Karen M. Becker et al., Scientific 
Dispute Resolution: First Use of Provision 404 of the Food and Drug 
Administration Modernization Act of 1997, 58 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 211, 220 (2003) 
(noting that in one case where clinical significance was specifically at issue, the 
FDA “shifted the scientific dispute from a complex specific question focused on 
clinical significance . . . to any scientific issue that . . . provided a basis for its 
not-approvable decision”); cf. 21 C.F.R. § 860.7(e)(1) (requiring reasonable 
assurance that medical devices provide clinically significant results). 
 252. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(5)(B) (2012).  
 253. Supra Part V.A. 
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merely requires statistical significance in human trials, as opposed 
to animal trials or in vitro studies.254  
This distinction is made explicitly in section 202.1 of the FDA 
drug advertising regulations, which provide that “as used in this 
section, ‘clinical investigations,’ ‘clinical experience’ and ‘clinical 
significance’ mean in the case of drugs intended for administration 
to man, investigations, experience, or significance in humans.”255 
Elsewhere in section 202.1, the regulation clarifies what does not 
constitute clinical significance, stating that an advertisement is 
false or misleading if it “contains favorable data or conclusions 
from nonclinical studies of a drug, such as in laboratory animals or 
in vitro, in a way that suggests they have clinical significance.”256 
Another provision in the same section states that an 
advertisement may be false or misleading if it “[u]ses the concept 
of ‘statistical significance’ to support a claim that has not been 
demonstrated to have clinical significance or validity,” i.e., if it has 
not been demonstrated to have statistical significance in 
humans.257 Figure 5 reflects the function of the clinical significance 
standard. 
Figure 5: Ensuring Relevance in Humans: Clinical Significance 
Nature of Problem Problem Regulatory Solution  
Relevance Efficacy data may not be relevant to humans Clinical significance 
By the terms of the FDA drug advertising regulation, this 
definition of clinical significance as meaning statistical significance 
in humans applies only to section 202.1.258 Nevertheless other 
documents such as FDA guidance and government reports are not 
inconsistent with this definition.259 A Government Accountability 
Office report, for example, notes that although there is no 
definition of “clinical significance” in the FDA medical device 
regulations, in the context of medical devices, the term is 
                                                                                                     
 254. Infra text accompanying notes 256–64. 
 255. 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(4)(ii)(b) (2013).  
 256. Id. § 202.1(e)(6)(vii) (emphasis added).  
 257. Id. § 202.1(e)(2)(7)(ii).  
 258. Id. § 202.1(e)(4)(ii)(b). 
 259. Infra notes 261–64 and accompanying text. 
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understood to mean results that “have a positive effect on the 
disease being treated according to the standard of care for the 
related field.”260 An FDA guidance document explains how to 
“provid[e] clinical evidence of effectiveness for human drug and 
biological products,”261 which at no point indicates that clinical 
significance implies an elevated level of efficacy. Section 2 of the 
guidance document, for example, discusses quantity of evidence, 
while Section 3 discusses quality of evidence.262 Both sections 
explain at length the flexible nature of the evidence standard, 
noting that in some situations “effectiveness of a new use may be 
extrapolated entirely from existing efficacy studies” without the 
need to conduct an additional study,263 and that under other 
circumstances “it is possible for sponsors to rely on [certain] 
studies to support effectiveness claims, despite less than usual 
documentation or monitoring.”264  
C. Cases Addressing Absolute Efficacy Fail to Distinguish Clinical 
and Statistical Significance 
The few cases to address both clinical and statistical 
significance fail to distinguish the terms on the basis of efficacy 
level. In general, they do not clearly distinguish the two terms at 
all, sometimes implying that there is a distinction but then 
declining to reach a decision on the basis of any distinction and 
often failing to clearly articulate or define any distinction.265 In 
                                                                                                     
 260. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-996, MEDICAL DEVICES: 
FDA’S APPROVAL OF FOUR TEMPOROMANDIBULAR JOINT IMPLANTS 8 n.9 (2007), 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07996.pdf. 
 261. FDA GUIDANCE, supra note 55, at 1 n.1. 
 262. See id. at 6–16 (providing guidance on the quantity of evidence needed 
in particular circumstances to establish substantial evidence of effectiveness); 
id. at 16–20 (discussing the factors that influence the quality of documentation 
evidence needed to support approval of a new human drug and biological 
product). 
 263. Id. at 6.  
 264. Id. at 17.  
 265. See infra notes 267–82 and accompanying text (discussing a case that 
addresses but fails to define a distinction between clinical and statistical 
significance). 
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other cases, clinical significance has been treated as if it is 
essentially synonymous with statistical significance.266  
One of the cases to discuss both clinical and statistical 
significance is the 1986 Third Circuit case of Warner-Lambert Co. 
v. Heckler,267 which involved the FDA’s withdrawal of approval of 
several oral proteolytic enzymes that had long been promoted as 
effective in relieving inflammation and pain, especially that arising 
from surgery, trauma, infection and allergic reactions.268 The drugs 
had initially received FDA approval prior to the Drug 
Amendments of 1962,269 at a time when approval formally required 
only a showing of safety, but not efficacy.270 The 1962 amendments 
required proof of efficacy not only for any new drugs submitted for 
approval after the effective date of the amendments, but also 
required the FDA to go back and review the efficacy of drugs that 
had already been approved prior to 1962, including the oral 
proteolytics at issue in Warner-Lambert.271 Following extensive 
review of the data submitted by Warner-Lambert and the other 
manufacturers in the case, an FDA administrative law judge (ALJ) 
concluded that the manufacturers had failed to establish that the 
drugs were effective.272 The FDA Commissioner upheld this 
finding.273 More than twenty years after the 1962 amendments, 
                                                                                                     
 266. See infra notes 282–87 and accompanying text (discussing two cases 
that did not distinguish between or base their holdings on a distinction between 
clinical and statistical significance). 
 267. 787 F.2d 147 (3d Cir. 1986). 
 268. See id. at 149 (“The Commissioner withdrew approval of the new drug 
applications for these drugs after concluding that there was a lack of substantial 
evidence that the OPEs will have effects they are purported or represented to 
have for their intended conditions of use.”). 
 269. Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (1962) (codified in scattered sections of 
21 U.S.C.). 
 270. See Warner-Lambert, 787 F.2d at 149 (“At the time approval was 
granted, the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act required the FDA to determine only 
that a drug was safe for human use.”). 
 271. See id. (“The 1962 amendments also required the FDA to reevaluate 
drugs that it had previously approved.”). 
 272. See id. at 150 (“The ALJ thus found that the drug manufacturers had 
not met their statutory burden of producing evidence demonstrating that the 
OPEs were effective.”). 
 273. See id. (“The Commissioner also found that there was a lack of 
substantial evidence that the . . . OPEs have the effects represented, and, 
accordingly, withdrew approval.”). 
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the case finally reached the Third Circuit, which upheld the 
Commissioner’s findings.274  
On the surface, certain statements in Warner-Lambert appear 
to support the proposition that statistical significance is distinctly 
different from clinical significance. According to the Third Circuit, 
“[t]he Commissioner's interpretation of the statute as requiring a 
showing of clinical significance, rather than merely statistical 
significance, is persuasive.”275 However, the rejection by the FDA 
(and court) for lack of efficacy seems in fact to have been based 
primarily on the faulty methodology of the studies under 
consideration rather than on any distinction between clinical and 
statistical significance.276 For example, one study had made 240 
comparisons between the placebo and study groups, finding six of 
those comparisons to be statistically significant.277 However, as 
discussed above, at the level of statistical certainty usually 
required for drug approval (p=.05), one in twenty studies can be 
expected to reflect a Type I error, erroneously indicating efficacy 
where there is none.278 With 240 comparisons, this would suggest 
(assuming independence) that perhaps twelve comparisons might 
erroneously show statistical significance where none exists, which 
is in the neighborhood of what was in fact observed.279 More 
importantly, the FDA Commissioner had found that the post-hoc 
“stratification of the subjects into subgroups . . . had no scientific 
basis.”280 What this means in lay terms is that it appeared to the 
                                                                                                     
 274. See id. at 159–60 (finding that the Commissioner had a reasonable 
basis for disqualifying each submission of Warner-Lambert’s studies attempting 
to establish that the drugs were effective and noting that the rejection of the 
studies is consistent with the possibility that the OPEs do not work).  
 275. Warner-Lambert Co. v. Heckler, 787 F.2d 147, 155 (3d Cir. 1986).  
 276. See id. at 160 (discussing the Commissioner’s rejection of faulty 
studies). 
 277. See id. at 155 (discussing the results of the study on the therapeutic 
effect of OPE Chymoral). 
 278. See 44 Fed. Reg. 51512, 51520 col. 3 (Aug. 31, 1979) (“As a matter of 
scientific custom, a statistically significant difference has sometimes been 
considered one that is likely to occur by chance 1 in 20 times or less. . . .”). 
 279. See Warner-Lambert, 787 F.2d at 155 (“Of the 240 tests, only six 
provided statistical results indicating that Chymoral had some 
effectiveness . . . .”). 
 280. Id. at 155. The FDA has repeatedly urged caution when statistical 
significance is found after multiple comparisons are made, owing to the elevated 
risk of Type I errors. See, e.g., William B. Hood, More on Sulfinpyrazone After 
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FDA that the manufacturers had inappropriately mined the data, 
after the fact, in such a way as to create the appearance of 
statistically significant results where none existed.281  
In another Third Circuit case from the 1980s, United States v. 
225 Cartons . . . of an Article or Drug,282 the court noted with 
approval the FDA’s requirement that new drugs demonstrate “a 
clinically, i.e., therapeutically, significant benefit . . . .”283 Once 
again, however, the drug product in question was not rejected on 
the basis of any distinction between clinical and statistical 
significance, but on the basis that the studies submitted by the 
manufacturer were inadequate to show that each of the putative 
active ingredients contributed to the drug’s efficacy.284 Nowhere 
did the court hold that statistically significant, but not clinically 
significant, results had been established.  
Similarly, in American Home Products Corp. v. Johnson & 
Johnson, Inc.,285 the Second Circuit found “no reliable evidence 
showing that [the aspirin in Anacin®] reduces inflammation to a 
clinically significant extent in the conditions listed in the 
                                                                                                     
Myocardial Infarction, 306(16) NEW ENG. J. MED. 988, 988–89 (1982) (discussing 
one study with inconsistent findings in which the FDA had concerns about data 
misclassification and exclusion). 
 281. See Warner-Lambert Co. v. Heckler, 787 F.2d 147, 155 (3d Cir. 1986) 
(showing that the six statistically significant results demonstrating 
effectiveness for reduction of pain were spread out over several different 
subgroups suffering various ailments and no comparison of the total drug group 
to the total placebo group was ever made). Repeated testing for statistical 
significance at frequent intervals during the trial process can also bias results 
and lead to Type I errors. See S.J. Pocock, Size of Cancer Clinical Trials and 
Stopping Rules, 38(6) BRIT. J. CANCER 757, 761 (1978) (“The more often one 
performs a significance test on the accumulating results in a trial, the greater is 
the chance that some significant difference will eventually be detected, even if 
the treatments are really equally effective.”); see also J.L. Haybittle, Repeated 
Assessment of Results in Clinical Trials of Cancer Treatment, 44 BRIT. J. 
RADIOLOGY 793, 796 (1971) (urging similar caution). 
 282. 871 F.2d 409 (3d Cir. 1989).  
 283. Id. at 416. 
 284. See id. at 415 (following the district court’s ruling that “Sandoz had 
failed to produce such studies for its FWC combination products, and thus the 
court rejected its claim of general recognition” (citing United States v. 225 
Cartons . . . of an Article or Drug, 687 F.Supp. 946, 962 (D.N.J. 1988)). Under 
the applicable FDA regulation, it must be shown that “each component [of a 
combination drug product] makes a contribution to the claimed effects.” Id. 
(quoting 21 C.F.R. § 300.50(a) (1988)). 
 285. 436 F. Supp. 785 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff’d, 577 F.2d 160 (2d Cir. 1978). 
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advertisements at OTC [over-the-counter] dosages.” As in 225 
Cartons, the Second Circuit based its holding not on any 
distinction between clinical and statistical significance, but on the 
basis of inadequate studies. The court noted that some of the 
documents submitted in support of efficacy consisted of “informal 
pieces” that were “not studies or tests at all.”286 Other 
documentation provided some evidence of statistically significant 
efficacy with respect to rheumatoid arthritis, but rheumatoid 
arthritis was not among the conditions for which the manufacturer 
was now claiming efficacy.287 
A 1979 administrative decision by then-FDA Commissioner 
Donald Kennedy also appears at first to endorse a meaningful 
distinction between clinical and statistical significance.288 In a 
Final Decision following a formal evidentiary public hearing in an 
adjudicative proceeding for the cough suppressant Benylin 
(diphenhydramine), Kennedy emphatically rejected “the fallacy of 
equating statistical significance with clinical significance.”289 He 
dismissed a 9% reduction in coughing, stating that it “may be 
statistically significant . . . but is not clinically significant.”290 In 
the end, however, the decision to decline approval for the 
antitussant indication of Benylin (diphenhydramine) seems to 
have been based on a finding that neither of the two studies 
qualified as an “adequate and well controlled investigation[],” and 
that therefore there was a “lack of ‘substantial evidence’ . . . that 
Benelyn will have the effect it purports . . . to have.”291 The 
Commissioner found troubling (1) the fact that statistically 
significant results were obtained only on the first day of the 
study;292 (2) that those results were not strongly statistically 
                                                                                                     
 286. Id. at 800–01. 
 287. See id. at 799 (discussing the general acceptance that Anacin has an 
anti-inflammatory effect in the treatment of rheumatic diseases at dosages 
exceeding that recommended for over-the-counter use). 
 288. Infra notes 289–90 and accompanying text. 
 289. Benylin Final Decision, 44 Fed. Reg. 51,512, 51,521 col. 1 (Aug. 31, 
1979). 
 290. Id. at 51,521 col. 2. 
 291. Id. at 51,537 col. 1. 
 292. See id. at 51,521 col. 3 (“It should also be noted that the results of 
the . . . study were statistically significant only on the first day of the 
study. . . .”). 
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significant;293 (3) that overall more patients were satisfied with the 
placebo than with Benelyn (diphenhydramine);294 (4) that overall 
the physician-investigators did not rate Benelyn 
(diphenhydramine) differently from placebo with any statistical 
significance;295 (5) that the placebo controls were inadequate 
because they contained ingredients that may have had 
pharmacological activity;296 and (6)  that the statistically 
significant results that were found were based on subjective 
responses (given by children aged six to twelve years) which the 
Commissioner found unreliable.297 In short, a number of factors 
other than any difference between statistical and clinical 
significance led to the Commissioner’s finding. In any event, the 
skeptical views of statistical significance expressed by a single 
FDA Commissioner who served in that role for only twenty-six 
months during the 1970s298 do not seem to have had a lasting 
impact on subsequent judicial decisions interpreting the 
substantial evidence standard, as seen in the cases just 
discussed.299  
The lack of any meaningful and enduring distinction between 
clinical and statistical significance with respect to drug efficacy has 
not gone entirely unnoticed.300 One scholar, after exhaustively 
                                                                                                     
 293. See id. (“[T]he results even on [the first day] were just on the borderline 
of statistical significance. A change in the reports of just a few patients would 
have eliminated this significance.”). 
 294. See id. (“More patients were satisfied with the [placebo] (90.3 percent) 
than with Benylin (84.3 percent).”). 
 295. See id. (“The other such measure was a question directed to 
investigators, which called for an overall rating as to beneficial drug-
attributable results from medication. The results did not reveal any statistically 
significant differences between Benylin and the [placebo]. . . .”). 
 296. See id. at 51,527 col. 3 (“I find that ammonium chloride and sodium 
citrate in the amounts used in the [placebo] may have expectorant, demulcent, 
or other pharmacological activity.”). 
 297. See id. at 51,529–30 (describing the inability of the patients to provide 
“valid subjective evaluations”). 
 298. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., About FDA: Donald Kennedy, Ph.D. (Feb. 20, 
2009), http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/Leaders/Commission 
ers/ucm093736.htm (last visited Sept. 18, 2013) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review).  
 299. See supra notes 267–87 and accompanying text (discussing judicial 
decisions interpreting the “substantial evidence” standard). 
 300. See infra note 301 and accompanying text (discussing an article that 
compares clinical and statistical significance). 
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analyzing the meaning of clinical significance in the context of 
FDA approval, patent infringement, false advertising, and product 
liability cases, concluded: 
Having presented a survey of the various indications from case 
law, legislative materials, and academic sources, it is apparent 
how little clarity, and certainly how little consensus, there is 
concerning the meaning and appropriate usage of the phrase 
“clinical significance.” . . . In fact, it appears that these 
requirements [for clinical significance] are so much like those 
for finding statistical significance as to be simply redundant. . . . 
As the phrase stands now, it makes little if any positive 
contribution to drug-related litigation, while at the same time 
causing several important problems that will only grow 
worse . . . .301 
Oddly, the distinction between clinical significance and statistical 
significance contained in the advertising regulations discussed 
above has been largely overlooked by the courts, commissioners 
and commentators that have discussed the subject.302 
D. Cases Addressing Comparative Efficacy Fail to Distinguish 
Clinical and Statistical Significance 
Even in the context of the FDA drug advertising regulation,303 
the meaning of clinical significance has sometimes been seemingly 
misunderstood. Section 202.1 defines as possibly false or 
misleading those advertisements that “[u]se[] the concept of 
‘statistical significance’ to support a claim that has not been 
demonstrated to have clinical significance or validity.”304 Only two 
reported cases quote or cite this provision, and only one of these 
engages with it substantively.305 In that case, AstraZeneca had 
                                                                                                     
 301. Sarah M.R. Cravens, The Usage and Meaning of “Clinical Significance” 
in Drug-Related Litigation, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 553, 594–96 (2002).  
302.  Similar language defining clinical significance has appeared in the drug 
advertising regulations since at least 1969. 21 C.F.R. § 1.105(e)(4)(iii)(b) (1969). 
 303. 21 C.F.R. § 202.1 (2013). 
 304. 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(7)(ii). 
 305. See AstraZeneca LP v. TAP Pharm. Prods., Inc., 444 F. Supp. 2d 278, 
282–89 (D. Del. 2006) (engaging in substantive discussion on 21 C.F.R. 
§202.1(e)(7)); Pa. Emps. Benefit Trust Fund v. Zeneca Inc., 499 F.3d 239, 248 
(3d Cir. 2007) (mentioning 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(7)), vacated, 129 U.S. 1578 
(2009).  
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promoted Nexium (esomeprazole) in a “Better is Better” campaign 
that claimed, among other things, that “recent medical studies . . . 
prove Nexium heals moderate to severe acid related damage in the 
esophagus better than the other leading prescription medicine.”306 
One of the human studies put forth by AstraZeneca reported an 
overall healing rate of 92.6% for Nexium (esomeprazole) versus 
88.8% for Prevacid (lansoprazole), an unimpressive difference that 
was nevertheless statistically significant.307 TAP Pharmaceuticals, 
the maker of Prevacid (lansoprazole), asserted that AstraZeneca 
had engaged in false advertising in violation of the Lanham Act,308 
and cited in support the FDA drug advertising regulations that 
prohibit the misleading use of statistical significance to mean 
clinical significance.309 TAP argued that the advertisement was 
“literally false because Nexium is only marginally better at healing 
EE [erosive esophagitis], and that difference is clinically 
meaningless.”310 Elsewhere, TAP asserted that “the Castell and 
Fennerty studies [on humans], as well as other studies, while 
statistically significant, are not clinically significant.”311 
Although the court declined to find a violation of the FDA drug 
advertising regulations, it did so without any reference to the 
distinction between animal and in vitro studies on the one hand, 
and clinical studies on the other.312 Indeed, the court seemed to 
tacitly accept the suggestion that clinical significance meant 
meaningful significance, finding that “the Castell and Fennerty 
studies are relevant to a consumer's use of Nexium” because 
“Nexium is at least statistically significantly better at healing 
                                                                                                     
 306. AstraZeneca LP, 444 F. Supp. 2d at 282.  
 307. Id. at 282–83.  
 308. Trademark Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1072. 
 309. See AstraZeneca LP, 444 F. Supp. 2d at 295 (discussing TAP’s assertion 
that AstraZeneca had engaged in false advertising). 
 310. Id. at 282. 
 311. Id. at 289. 
 312. See id. at 295. 
Thus, citation to the FDA guidelines, in the absence of proof of literal 
falsity or misleading of the public, is insufficient to show that the 
claims in the Better is Better campaign are false. Because there are 
no genuine issues of material fact, and TAP cannot meet its burden 
on literal falsity, summary judgment will be granted to AstraZeneca 
on this issue. 
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[esophageal] damage.”313 The court also pointed out that because of 
the “‘separate jurisprudence that has evolved’ under the Lanham 
Act and under the FDA,” the mere violation of the FDA drug 
advertising regulation in question, even if established, would be 
insufficient to show that the claims were literally false or 
misleading under the Lanham Act.314 TAP could not assert the 
FDA drug advertising regulations directly because, in general, only 
the United States may bring actions under the Food, Drug and 
Cosmetic Act315 or FDA drug advertising regulations.316 
VI. Conclusion 
The very long and expensive process of new drug research and 
development might suggest to casual observers that the efficacy 
standard for drugs is elevated and substantial, but the review of 
the law just presented reveals that while the evidence standard 
may be substantial, the efficacy standard itself is almost entirely 
illusory. Under 21 U.S.C. § 355(d), drug sponsors may obtain FDA 
approval of a new drug so long as they do not “purport[] or . . . 
represent[]” the drug to have greater efficacy than can be shown by 
substantial evidence, essentially delegating to drug companies the 
ability to set as low an efficacy bar as they wish (safety aside). 
Moreover, the substantial evidence standard itself allows for 
approval of a new drug based upon two (in some cases, one) 
statistically significant clinical trials “even though there may be 
preponderant evidence to the contrary based upon equally reliable 
studies.”317 Not only do the trials that might constitute 
                                                                                                     
 313. Id. at 282. 
 314. Id. at 295 (quoting Sandoz Pharm. Corp. v. Richardson-Vicks, Inc., 902 
F.2d 222, 229 (3d Cir. 1990)).  
 315. See 21 U.S.C. § 337(a) (2012) (“[A]ll such proceedings for the 
enforcement, or to restrain violations, of this chapter shall be by and in the 
name of the United States.”); State ex rel. McGraw v. Johnson & Johnson, 704 
S.E.2d 677, 687 n.6 (W.Va. 2010) (“[T]ypically, only the United States is entitled 
to enforce an action under the FDCA. As such, claims brought to enforce 
violations of the FDCA by any party other than the United States are generally 
preempted.” (citation omitted)). 
 316. See Kemp v. Medtronic, Inc., 231 F.3d 216, 236 (6th Cir. 2000) (“[N]o 
private cause of action exists for a violation of the FDCA.”). 
 317. S. REP. NO. 87-1744 (1962), reprinted in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2884, 2892. 
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“preponderant evidence to the contrary” not necessarily bar 
approval, but selective publication means that they often may not 
even be known to prescribing doctors, legislators, insurance 
companies and others, frustrating private efforts at rational drug 
use. Despite both legislative and private efforts to curb selective 
publication of only positive trials, publication bias remains a 
problem.318 
The sensible elements that underlie the substantial evidence 
standard also fail to ensure that new drugs possess any particular 
level of efficacy. “Substantial evidence” is defined by statute to 
mean “evidence consisting of adequate and well-controlled 
investigations, including clinical investigations.”319 Accompanying 
FDA regulations suggest, but do not necessarily require, that these 
investigations conform to the “gold standard.” The gold standard 
elements of randomization, blinding, and placebo control may help 
to counter the various types of bias in the experimental process, 
but none specifies the magnitude of efficacy needed for a trial to 
succeed. Similarly, the concept of statistical significance, which is 
generally used by the FDA in its evaluations of efficacy based on 
gold standard trials, is merely a measure of certainty and not a 
measure of efficacy. “Clinical significance” and “statistical 
significance” are distinct concepts, and the law does require that 
new drugs demonstrate evidence of clinical significance, but the 
term “clinical significance” merely means significance in humans 
as opposed to significance in vitro or in non-human animals. The 
difference in these two terms thus lies not in the magnitude of 
efficacy, but in the nature of the trial.  
Figure 6 summarizes the various challenges in evaluating 
drug efficacy and the regulatory or scientific standards designed to 
address each: 
                                                                                                     
 318. See supra Part IV.A.3 and Figure 3 (discussing publication bias). 
 319. 21 U.S.C. § 355 (d)(7) (2012). 
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Figure 6: Efficacy Evaluation Problems and Existing Regulatory 
Solutions 
In short, there is no legal efficacy standard. Although the need 
for statistical significance might imply that new drugs must at 
least be better than nothing (zero efficacy), there is no minimum 
quantum of difference from zero that is required, making the 
standard illusory in a way reminiscent of how mathematics 
describes .9̄ (point nine repeating) as exactly equal to 1. The 
influencing of trial results by drug sponsors, suggested by studies 
that demonstrate inconsistent comparative efficacy results that 
correlate with the study sponsor, can make whatever tiny 
quantum of efficacy difference that may be required entirely 
disappear. Making highly effective drugs may be complex, 
expensive, and difficult, and the law must be sensitive to the 
significant technical challenges drug companies face. At the same 
time, greater awareness of the illusory efficacy standard is badly 
needed in order to enable physicians, patients, governments, and 
society at large to make rational choices about the risks they are 
Nature of 
Problem 
Problem Regulatory Solution  
Relevance Efficacy data may not be 
relevant to humans 
Clinical significance 
Quality Biases, e.g., 
• Selection bias 
• Observer bias 
• Response bias 
Anecdotal or unreliable 




• Placebo control 
Substantial evidence 
standard 
Certainty Type I error, 
(i.e., the appearance of 








Magnitude Efficacy level is too low None  
(i.e., allow the “free-market” 
to evaluate the effect a drug 
“purports or is represented to 
have”) 
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willing to undertake and the medicines for which they are willing 
to pay. 
